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I. Introduction
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois' the Supreme Court con-
strued section 4' of the Clayton Act,8 which provides, in part:
That any person who shall be injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefore .. . without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.'
In doing so the court held that passing-on 5 cannot be used offen-
sively by a plaintiff to obtain standing to sue under that section.
The Illinois Brick court based part of its decision on its earlier
decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., where it held that a defendant may not use passing-on to
insulate itself from attack by a direct purchaser.7 This article
will consider in detail the methodological objections cited by the
Supreme Court as reasons for the Illinois Brick rule.e Illinois
Brick's decision was based, in part, on an unwillingness to estab-
lish a doctrine of treble damage recovery founded on an eco-
1. 431 U.S. 720, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). For an economic analysis of Illi-
nois Brick undertaken soon after the Supreme Court's decision, see Landes & Poner,
Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 602 (1979) [hereinafter
referred to as Landes & Posner).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1976). The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914,
nearly twenty five years after the enactment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1976). Whereas the Sherman Act generally proscribes unreasonable restraints of
trade, the Clayton Act provides more specific antitrust legislation. See generally P.
AEREA & D. TuRNmi, H ANTRusT LAW §§ 303-304 (1978).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
5. "Passaing-on" occurs when a purchaser who has been forced to pay illegally high
prices, passes the cost on to his customers. The United States Supreme Court rejected a
passing-on defense in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968), where the defendant argued that the plaintiff was not injured by the defendant's
alleged monopolistic acts since plaintiff passed the cost on to its customers. Id. at 494. In
Illinois Brick, the Court was called upon to determine whether certain indirect purchas-
ers could satisfy standing by advancing the passing-on theory to prove injury caused by
the antitrust defendants. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 726.
6. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
7. Id. at 494.
8. The Court stated "'sound laws of economics' can only heighten the awareness of
the difficulties and uncertainties involved in determining how the relevant market vari-
ables would have behaved had there been no overcharge." Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. at 743.
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nomic theory the court regarded as dubious.
It is this article's thesis that the "simplifying assumptions of
economic theory" regarded by the Court as implausible premises
on which to base a treble damages recovery are readily under-
standable and capable of application to antitrust cases. Logic
and common sense suggest that if the economic theory inform-
ing the measurement and apportionment of damages is brought
into close conformity with perceived reality, the rationale sup-
porting the holding in Illinois Brick will be seriously attenuated,
perhaps to the point of nullification.
This article's review of the law will focus chiefly on Illinois
Brick and its predecessor, Hanover Shoe, which determine the
class of aggrieved persons permitted to litigate their claims
under the antitrust laws. The legal doctrines of these seminal
cases will be dissected, using economic theory to reveal their
sometimes subtle and often unanticipated practical conse-
quences. The result will reveal three subversions of the antitrust
laws: First, the doctrine of standing fashioned by the Court in
Illinois Brick denies compensatory damages to a large number
of persons within the protection of section 4. Sec6nd, the denial
of a forum to many persons "injured" within the meaning of sec-
tion 4 dilutes the deterrent efficacy of the antitrust laws. Third,
the practical implications of the Illinois Brick rule provide in-
centives for firms to engage in conspiratorial price fixing, if cer-
tain commonly occuring and easily identifiable market condi-
tions prevail. Section II of this article discusses the requirement
of standing, satisfaction of which is essential to the maintenance
of a suit. The purpose behind such discussion is to evaluate the
holding of Illinois Brick in terms of its effectiveness in promot-
ing the apparent policies behind the antitrust laws. Section III
elaborates on the passing-on doctrine which is used to limit the
group of possible litigants. This article's position is that if the
compensation objective of section 4 is to be furthered, all per-
sons injured, wherever they may be situated in the distribution
chain, should be able to threaten to sue based on an antitrust
violation. This might result in deterrence of inchoate violations.
The Supreme Court ruling, which prohibited the use of offensive
passing-on, therefore actually impedes the ability of antitrust
legislation to reach its goals. Section IV of this article contends,
[Vol. 2:153
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contrary to the proposition set forth by Landes and Posner,"
that the Illinois Brick rule does result in harm to indirect pur-
chasers. This section also shows that the "array of simplifying
assumptions"10 which the Court finds so objectionable can be re-
placed by others embodying a more plausible representation of
reality. The new premises generate a theory of the market ad-
justment mechanism rendering the task of measuring the appor-
tionment of damages among indirect purchasers no more diffi-
cult than measuring damages sustained by direct purchasers in
the usual antitrust lawsuit. Section V examines some possible
consequences which might result from the Illinois Brick rule
when applied to section I of the Sherman Act. The procedural
devices protecting defendants from multiple liability are set out
in section VI. The availability of these devices reduces the need
for the Illinois Brick rule. Section VII sets forth a justification
of the use of economic theory in the context of price fixing
arrangements.
H. The Evolution of "Standing" Prior to Illinois Brick
To recover treble damages under section 4, a plaintiff must
show that an antitrust violation was committed by the defen-
dant which caused injury to plaintiff's business or property, re-
flected the anticompetitive effects of that violation, and resulted
in measurable damages.
The Federal courts have developed and applied the doctrine
of "Standing" as a device for determining whether a claimant
shall be permitted to seek relief under section 4. In the following
discussions I will undertake a brief review of the Standing doc-
trine in its several guises so that I may appraise the holding in
Illinois Brick in terms of its efficacy in promoting the apparent
purposes of the antitrust laws.
A. The Requirement of Causality - "by reason of'
The courts have imposed certain conditions which narrow
the scope of section 4's available remedies despite the breadth of
its language. One of these requires that the plaintiff show the
9. Landes & Posner, supra note 1.
10. Illinois Brick Co. v. Mlinois, 431 U.S. at 741-42.
1982]
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existence of a sufficiently close causal relationship between the
act complained of and the injury claimed. The standing doc-
trine"1 embodies a policy concept of "proximate causation""2
which is designed to confine the effect of defendant's conduct
within reasonable limits, to avoid windfalls and double recovery,
to prevent litigation from clogging the courts, and to avoid in-
surmountable evidentiary and proof problems. Thus, the courts
have insisted upon "direct" as opposed to "indirect, remote, and
consequential" harm to the plaintiff.18 As the Supreme Court
stated in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.," "[t]he lower courts have
been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not
intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all
injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust
violation." '
Varied and conflicting standards for determining standing
have been formulated by the courts. Many of these, however, are
simply descriptive labels masking contradictory reasoning and
results.
Some courts have devised the "direct injury" test by charac-.
terizing the nature of the plaintiff's relationship to a more im-
mediately injured party.'6 Other courts have adopted the "target
area" test, that is, whether the plaintiff is within the area of the
economy in which a breakdown of competitive conditions is en-
dangered by the challenged conduct," or whether plaintiff "was
not only hit, but was aimed at."' 8 Pursuant to this test, some
11. The review of the standing doctrine in this article is not intended to be histori-
cally comprehensive. This article seeks only to set forth the propositions and economic
tests which are to be applied in cases brought under section 4 of the Sherman Act. For a
thorough discussion of Antitrust standing, see Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical
Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L. J. 809 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp. 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955).
13. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.2d 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).
14. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
15. Id. at 262-63 n. 14 (citations omitted).
16. See, e.g., Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir.
1958). The shareholder had no standing to sue for conspiracy to cut off the corporation's
supply of films because "plaintiff's claim is only derivative from that injury and.., he
. . . must be content with the increase in value of his shares because of any recovery by
the corporation." Id.
17. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty National Life Ins., Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975).
18. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp. 221 F.2d at 365.
[Vol. 2:153
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courts have required that plaintiff's injury be the foreseeable re-
sult of defendant's actions, while others have rejected the need
for (or even the relevance of) any such showing.'9 Still other
courts have phrased standing in terms of whether the plaintiff is
arguably within the "zone of interests" protected by the anti-
trust laws,2° or they have employed a functional analysis on a
case-by-case basis." Under one standard or another, indirectly
injured parties such as shareholders, employees, officers, credi-
tors, franchisors, lessors and suppliers have, with certain excep-
tions, been denied standing to assert claims of competitive harm
while allowing the immediately injured party to bring such
claims.22 In addition, some courts also insisted upon privity be-
tween plaintiff and defendant. 8 Some courts, however, granted
standing to final purchasers or ultimate consumers even when a
price-fixed item was incorporated as a component in an entirely
different product.' Still other courts held that standing for final
purchasers was appropriate only where a price-fixed item was
purchased in substantially the same form."5
B. The Requirement of "Injury" to "Business or Property"
In the same year that Illinois Brick was decided the Su-
preme Court held in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat26
19. Compare Blackenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975) (newspaper
distributor had standing to sue newspaper publisher since his alleged injury was within
the affected area of the economy which was the target of the anticompetitive conduct),
with Calderone Enter. Corp. v United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 390 (1972) (landlord corporation of motion picture
theatres denied standing to sue motion picture distributors since the corporation was not
itself a target of the alleged anticompetitive conduct).
20. See, e.g., Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
21. See, e.g, Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501 (3d
Cir. 1976).
22. See generally P. Areeda supra note 3, at §§ 334-42.
23. E.g. City and County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 636-38 (D.
Colo. 1971).
24. E.g. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 431 U.S. 720; In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
25. E.g. In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Philadel-
phia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nor. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438
F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
26. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
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that it was insufficient for the competitors of allegedly illegally
acquired companies to demonstrate injury only casually linked
to the illegal acquisition. The Court stated:
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say...
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to... prevent
and that flows from that which makes... defendants' acts un-
lawful. The injury should reflect the ... anticompetitive effect
either of the violation or of.. anticompetitive acts made possi-
ble by the violation."7
This language indicates that to acquire standing in a treble
damage action a plaintiff must prove not only the nexus of cau-
sality between the act complained of and the injury suffered, but
also that the injury is of the sort which constitutes an anticom-
petitive effect of the illegal acts.28
The Court has provided little guidance in identifying a le-
gally cognizable "anticompetitive effect." One approach sug-
gested by this paper is to define a section 4 anticompetitive in-
jury, as any consequence of illegal acts which economically
disadvantages innocent persons in ways which would not have
occurred but for the violation. This approach requires a plaintiff
to prove an antitrust violation and a causal linkage as conditions
precedent to a finding of "anticompetitive injury." Once both
conditions are satisfied the plaintiff need only show that his eco-
nomic well being has been adversly affected to meet the injury
requirement. The Brunswick holding rejects this simple and di-
rect approach in favor of a more opaque test based on the unde-
fined notion of "anticompetitive effects." How these effects are
to be identified in practical cases is far from clear. The guide-
lines suggested by the Court, "injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent, '' 29 is merely a tautology in the
guise of a criterion. The merit of the suggested approach is that
it obviates a judicial inquiry into the esoterica of economic the-
ory for the purpose of distinguishing "antitrust injury" from
27. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
28. See, e.g., John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1977); GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413
U.S. 901 (1973); A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma Instruments, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
63,123 (D. Mass. 1980).
29. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 489.
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other injury which does not "reflect anticompetitive effects."
From a strictly logical point of view, an attempt to identify
causes of economic injury by the affixing of labels is simply an
arbitrary exercise.
The theory of antitrust injury as urged in this article is
grounded in the logical proposition that the economic process of
"competition" must, by its nature, result in some firms suffering
harm which benefits others. Vigorous competition among firms
manifested in product quality, pricing policies, and technologicalinnovations will result in some firms prospering and others de-
clining. This is the natural result of functioning markets and
should be allowed. Only if the declining firms can show that
their decline is the reasonably proximate consequence of an an-
titrust violation should they be permitted to recover their dam-
ages from the violators.
The Supreme Court seems to have endorsed, at least implic-
itly, the proposition that an economic loss to a firm constitutes
an "injury", although it has stopped short of characterizing all
such injuries as antitrust injuries if they were brought about by
antitrust violations.30 Although the Court has approached the
injury theory suggested by this article when interpreting the
"business or property" language of section 4, it seems unwilling
to recognize the concilience between the injury theory and its
construction of "business or property." As recently as 1979 the
Court held that a consumer of goods or services for personal,
rather than commercial, use whose money value was diminished
by an antitrust violation, had a section 4 "property" injury.u
While the Court noted that "Congress plainly intended to ex-
clude some category of injuries in choosing the phrase 'business
or property', for section 4"'1 personal injury claims, it rejected
the contention that injury to a commercial interest was neces-
30. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Court ruled that injury
to a state's general economy was not cognizable under section 4. The words "business or
property" were construed to mean "commercial interests or enterprises." Id. at 264. See
Illinois Brick Co. v. Ulinois, 431 U.S. at 733 n.13.
31. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (consumers of hearing aids, who
were forced to pay excessive prices due to antitrust violations, sustained an injury within
the "business or property" language of section 4).
32. Id. at 338 (emphasis in original).
1982]
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sary, 5 and accorded the term "property" its ordinary and inde-
pendent significance." The Court added that "when a commer-
cial enterprise suffers a loss of money it suffers an injury to its
'business' and its 'property'."3 5 Thus, this statement recognizes
that an economic loss to a firm constitutes an "injury" within
the meaning of section 4. This recognition may be embodied log-
ically in the doctrine that any pecuniary loss confers standing to
recover, if it can be shown that the defendant's illegal acts
caused the loss.
C. Recovery of "damages. . .sustained"
The measure of damages in private antitrust litigation must
be contrasted with impact, or the fact of damage. The Supreme
Court stated, in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment
Paper Co.,85 that the jury verdict must reflect the damages
proved:
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the dam-
age, but there was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a
clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to estab-
lish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the
measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount.
The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages ap-
plies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to
those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and
only uncertain in respect to their amount.37
In a subsequent case, a lower court noted, regarding the fact of
damage, "that the plaintiff is required to establish with reasona-
ble probability the existence of some causal connection between
defendant's wrongful act and some loss of anticipated reve-
33. While the court has dispensed with the need to show an injury to "business"
under section 4, the term "business or property" has been held to involve a commercial
venture or enterprise, see Broadcasters, Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corp., 185 F.
Supp. 641 (D.N.J. 1960), as well as an occupation or trade, e.g., Daily v. Quality School
Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967). A plaintiff does not have to be actually engaged
in an ongoing business, however, if he can demonstrate an intention and readiness to
enter the business.
34. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. at 339.
35. Id.
36. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
37. Id. at 562.
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nue."38 Regarding the measure of damages, however, the Su-
preme Court stated in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,3 °
that the plaintiff need not submit direct and positive proof and
the trier of fact could make "a just and reasonable estimate of
the damage based on relevant data . "..."0 In a later case, the
Court supplemented the "just and reasonable" criterion estab-
lished by Bigelow:
Trial and appellate courts alike must also observe the practical
limits of the burden of proof which may be demanded of a treble-
damage plaintiff who seeks recovery for injuries from a partial or
total exclusion from a market; damage issues in these cases are
rarely susceptible to the kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury
which is available in other contexts. The Court has repeatedly
held that in the absence of more precise proof, the factfinder may
'conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the
proof of defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure
plaintiffs' business, and from the evidence of the decline in prices,
profits and values, not shown to be attributable to other causes,
that defendants' wrongful acts had caused damage to the
plaintiffs. 1
There are alternative definitions and measurements for re-
coverable damages in cases brought under section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act. In a conspiracy or monopolization case, plaintiffs may
prove their damages by establishing the amount of an illegal
overcharge, without having to ascertain the effect on their prof-
its.4 2 Proof of the pre- and post-conspiracy price will usually be
sufficient to demonstrate the price that otherwise would have
prevailed in a competitive market.4 3 Thus, "in a price fixing
case, impact and damages are coextensive; the overcharge consti-
tutes the plaintiff's injury (impact) as well as the measure of his
damage (damages) . . ."" Besides recovering the overcharge,
38. Flintkote Co. v. LysfJord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957).
39. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
40. Id. at 264.
41. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1969) (ci-
tations omitted) (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. at 264).
42. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United States Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. at 488-89.
43. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
44. Ohio Valley Electric Corp. v. General Electric Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 933
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
19821
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plaintiff may also recover "any lost profits resulting from in-
creased costs." 45 When seeking to recover lost profits, plaintiff
must estimate what the profits would have been absent the
wrong. For this purpose, a before and after showing of plaintiff's
or a competitor's net profits may suffice where, for example, de-
fendants unlawfully refused to deal with plaintiff.4' Plaintiff
may also establish lost profits as damages on the basis of the
estimated market share that he would have enjoyed in the ab-
sence of the violation.4 v Alternative measures of recovery are
plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses,' 8 or the depreciation in the
valuation of his capital.49
This brief recital of the alternative definitions and measure-
ment of recoverable damages should suffice to demonstrate that
the courts cannot avoid coming to grips with esoteric techniques
of economic and statistical analysis for the purpose of ascertain-
ing the answers to "what if" sorts of questions; e.g., if prices had
not been fixed, what would plaintiffs profits have been? If de-
fendants had not conspired in a refusal to deal with plaintiff,
what would have been the latter's market share? And so on.
These questions and others of like nature which invariably arise
in treble damages actions compel the courts to admit into evi-
dence and rule on the probative value of what has been pejora-
tively characterized by the Supreme Court as "an economist's
hypothetical model." In short, if a treble damages plaintiff is
successful in establishing liability then the triers of fact perforce
entertain "an economist's hypothetical model" in deliberating on
the "what if" question.
I will consider in detail the methodological objections cited
by the Supreme Court as reasons for the rule of Illinois Brick. I
will show that the very same issues and difficulties which the
Court cited arise in the context of a direct-purchaser treble
damages suit. The ineluctable conclusion is that the "sound laws
45. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at 201.
46. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. at 262-63; see Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 376-79 (1927).
47. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. at 118-19.
48. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d at 390-91.
49. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. at 561-62. For
a general discussion of the scope and assessment of recoverable damages see Annot., 16
A.L.R. Fed. 14 (1973).
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of economics" which the Court claims "can only heighten the
awareness of the difficulties and uncertainties involved in deter-
mining how the relevant market variables would have behaved
had there been no overcharge" render the rationale of Illinois
Brick nugatory.
IMl. The Evolution of Passing-On
A. The Judicial Doctrines
The concept of "passing-on" is closely related to, but dis-
tinct from, the standing and injury doctrines applicable to anti-
trust actions. For example, in defense to a treble damage action,
a defendant manufacturer may argue that plaintiff wholesaler
passed on the illegal overcharge to his customers by increasing
his prices in the amount of the overcharge and thus the plaintiff
suffered no section 4 injury. Conversely, those ultimate consum-
ers may assert passing-on offensively against the manufacturer
on the theory that they paid the manufacturer's illegal over-
charge and were thereby injured. These complex issues were ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in the Illinois Brick and Hanover
Shoe decisions.
In Hanover Shoe, a manufacturer of shoes brought an ac-
tion against a shoe machinery manufacturer and distributor
charging that the latter's practice of leasing but refusing to sell
its machinery constituted monopolization. The manufacturer
contended that the purchaser was not injured because the illegal
overcharge was reflected in the price of plaintiff's shoes; even if
it had bought machines at lower prices, plaintiff would have
made the same profit as it made by leasing because it would
have charged less for its shoes. The Supreme Court rejected this
passing-on defense, holding that a prima facie case of injury
under section 4 is established once a buyer shows the existence
and amount of an illegal overcharge.50 The Court also rejected
50. The Court stated:
If in the face of the overcharge the buyer does nothing and absorbs the loss,
he is entitled to treble damages. This much seems conceded. The reason is that he
has paid more than he should and his property has been illegally diminished, for
had the price paid been lower, his profits would have been higher. It is also clear
that if the buyer, responding to the illegal price, maintains his own price but takes
steps to increase his volume or to decrease other costs, his right to damages is not
1982]
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the argument that this rule should not apply where, for example,
the demand for the buyer's product is so inelastic that he and
his competitors could increase their prices accordingly without
losing sales.51 The Court continued by stating that indirect pur-
chasers, such as ultimate consumers, have little incentive to sue
because of the small damages recoverable, thereby reducing the
overall effectiveness of treble damage actions.
The Hanover Shoe doctrine prohibits defensive passing-on,
thus precluding a manufacturer from asserting passing-on as a
defense to a suit by a direct purchaser: the mirror image of this
doctrine is found in Illinois Brick.88 This mirror image rule bars
would-be plaintiffs from invoking passing-on to gain standing in
treble damage actions brought under section 4.
In Illinois Brick, plaintiffs, state and local governmental en-
tities, initiated an action alleging that the defendants, concrete
block manufacturers, had fixed the price of blocks. Plaintiffs had
purchased blocks from general contractors in the form of com-
pleted masonry structures. The general contractors in turn
bought the blocks from masonry contractors who had purchased
them from the manufacturers. Plaintiffs brought suit claiming
that the illegal overcharges had been passed on to them through
the intermediaries from whom they had purchased. The Court
destroyed. Though he may manage to maintain his profit level, he would have
made more if his purchases from the defendant had cost him less. We hold that
the buyer is equally entitled to damages if he raises the price for his own product.
As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer
more than the law allows. At whatever price the buyer sells, the price he pays 'the
seller remains illegally high, and his profits would be greater were his costs lower.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United States Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. at 489.
51. In this context the Court reasoned:
Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and
in the amount of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had
not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of
demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his
prices absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge
been discontinued. Since establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense
would require a convincing showing of each of these virtually unascertainable
figures, the task would normally prove insurmountable.
Id. at 493 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 494.
53. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 728. The characterization of Illinois
Brick as the "mirror image" of Hanover Shoe is due to Landes & Posner, supra note 1,
at 603.
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did not address the standing issue, which the lower court deci-
sions had focused upon, "except to note... that the question of
which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for
purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct from the question of
which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them
standing to sue for damages under § 4. ' " By applying the con-
verse of the Hanover Shoe rule, the Supreme Court held that
only "the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the
chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his
business or property' within the meaning of Section 4."85 The
Court, which noted the complexities involved in analyzing which
portion of the overcharge was actually passed on and diminished
the incentive of direct purchasers to sue, reasoned that any
other rule would create a serious risk of multiple liability for de-
fendants as well as limiting the effectiveness of the antitrust
laws.586 According to the Court, even in the unlikely event that
all potential claimants could or would be joined in a litigation,
the use of passing-on theories would result in massive efforts to
apportion recovery among conflicting claims of plaintiffs at dif-
ferent levels of distribution. The Court noted the limited utility
of economics in this context:
Under an array of simplifying assumptions, economic theory pro-
vides a precise formula for calculating how the overcharge is dis-
tributed between the overcharged party (passer) and its custom-
ers (passees). If the market for the passer's product is perfectly
competitive; if the overcharge is imposed equally on all of the
passer's competitors; and if the passer maximizes its profits, then
the ratio of the shares of the overcharge borne by passee and
passer will equal the ratio of the elasticities of supply and de-
mand in the market for the passer's product. Even if these as-
sumptions are accepted, there remains a serious problem of mea-
suring the relevant elasticities-the percentage change in the
quantities of the passer's product demanded and supplied in re-
sponse to a one percent change in price. In view of the difficulties
that have been encountered, even in informal adversary proceed-
ings, with the statistical techniques used to estimate these con-
cepts,... it is unrealistic to think that elasticity studies intro-
54. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 728 n. 7.
55. Id. at 729.
56. Id. at 732-33.
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duced by expert witnesses will resolve the pass-on issue.57
The "array of simplifying assumptions" was invoked by the
Court as the chief reason for denying plaintiffs the opportunity
to establish their claim by means of offensive passing-on. In-
deed, the Court went so far as to deny to all similarly situated
indirect purchasers the opportunity to litigate an otherwise mer-
itorious claim against conspiratorial price fixers. The Court fur-
ther reasoned that the use of passing-on would entail the nearly
insurmountable difficulties of tracing the effects of the over-
charge on the prices, costs, sales and profits of the purchaser and
proving that they would have behaved differently without the
overcharge. 58 While conceding that these complexities will be
less substantial in some contexts than in others, such as where a
middleman resells goods without altering them or where a price-
fixed good is a small part of a larger product, the Court refused
to carve out exceptions for particular types of markets.59 Finally,
the Court noted its concern for the reduction in effectiveness of
treble damage cases if they were brought by indirect purchasers
with a smaller stake in the outcome than direct purchasers suing
for the full amount of the overcharge.60
57. Id. at 741-42 (emphasis in original) (citation and footnotes omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 743-44. The Court noted that-
This Court in Hanover Shoe indicated the narrow scope it intended for any
exception to its rule barring pass-on defenses by citing, as the only example of a
situation where the defense might be permitted, a pre-existing cost-plus contract.
In such as situation, the purchaser is insulated from any decrease in its sales as a
result of attempting to pass on the overcharge, because its customer is committed
to buying a fixed quantity regardless of price. The effect of the overcharge is es-
sentially determined in advance, without reference to the interaction of supply
and demand that complicates the determination in the general case.
Id. at 736. Further, the Court added: "Another situation in which market forces have
been superceded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct pur-
chaser is owned or controlled by its customer." Id.
60. Since Illinois Brick was decided in 1977, the courts have had occasion to rule on
a variety of claims entailing application of the Illinois Brick rule and its express excep-
tions: cost plus contracts and ownership or control of direct purchaser by its customer.
The types of claims subject to the Illinois Brick rule are exemplified by the following
Stotter & Co. v. Amstar Corp. (In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation), 579 F.2d 13
(3d Cir. 1979); Pony Creek Cattle Co. v. A. & P. (In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litiga-
tion), 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980); Mid-West Paper
Prod. Co. v. The Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979); Phillips v. Crown
Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980);
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It is the contention of this paper that "simplifying assump-
tions of economic theory," regarded by the Court as implausible
premises on which to base a treble damages recovery, are unnec-
essarily simplistic. The Supreme Court decided as it did in Illi-
nois Brick, (at least in part), because it was unwilling to estab-
lish a doctrine of treble damages recovery based on dubious
economic theory. Logic as well as common sense suggests that if
the economic theory informing the measurement and apportion-
ment of damages is brought into close conformity with perceived
reality, the rationale supporting the holding in Illinois Brick will
be seriously attenuated perhaps to the point of nullification. In a
subsequent section of this paper, we will show that the "array of
simplifying assumptions" which the Court finds so objectionable
can be replaced by others which embody a more plausible repre-
sentation of reality. The new premises generate a theory of the
market adjustment mechanism such as will render the task of
measuring the apportioning damages among indirect purchasers
of no more difficulty than that of measuring the damages sus-
tained by direct purchasers in the usual antitrust lawsuit.
A by-product of the economic analysis, which is important
in its own right, relates to the potential perversion of the anti-
trust laws produced by the holding of Illinois Brick. This per-
version consists of the introduction of a new and subtle incen-
tive for participants in oligopolistic markets to engage in price-
fixing agreements. We will see that the same theory which
reveals how damages are apportioned among all the victims of a
price-fixing conspiracy can also be used to reveal the conditions
under which price-fixing agreements may be effected with
impunity.
B. Congressional Response to the Judicial Doctrines
The holding in Illinois Brick was motivated in part by the
Lefrak v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 77,723 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
The "ownership or control" exception was adjudicated in several cases: In re Sugar
Industry Antitrust Litigation, 579 F.2d 13; In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600
F.2d 1148; Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v. The Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573;
Beckers v. Intl Snowmobile Indus. Ass'n, 581 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 986 (1977); In re Fertilizer Antitrust Litigation, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 79,172
(E.D. Wash. 1979); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
72,495 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
1982]
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
Court's construction of the legislative intent of the 1976 Anti-
trust Improvements Act, 62 and Congress' satisfaction with the
Court's interpretation may be gauged by reviewing legislative ac-
tivity in the aftermath of Illinois Brick. The inference which
emerges from such a review is that there is widespread dissatis-
faction in both houses with the Court's ruling which effectively
closes the courthouse doors to all but direct customers of anti-
trust violators. 2 The Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979, S. 300,
was approved by a divided Senate Judiciary Committee." This
proposed legislation would overrule Illinois Brick by allowing re-
covery even if a plaintiff had not dealt directly with the defen-
dant. The bill would also modify Hanover Shoe by permitting a
defendant to assert passing-on either as a partial or complete
defense, solely in order to avoid duplicative liability. " The Act
is currently awaiting action by the full Senate." Companion leg-
islation was introduced in the House of Representatives where
the Judiciary Committee held hearings, but no bill has been re-
ported out of Committee. e These legislative responses to Illinois
Brick and Hanover Shoe suggest that Congress is attempting to
correct what it regards as an inaccurate reading of legislative in-
tent by the Supreme Court.
IV. Economic Analysis of the Consequences of the Rule
61. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 15 U.S.C. § 15(c). For
the Court's interpretation of the relevant section of the Act and the legislative history
bearing on the issue of offensive passing-on as presented in Illinois Brick, see 431 U.S. at
733 n. 14.
62. Legislation to overrule Illinois Brick and to modify Hanover Shoe was initially
approved by the Senate and the House in 1978, but Congress adjourned before further
action was taken. See S. Rep. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H. Rep. No. 1397,
95th Cong., 2d Sees. (1978). See generally, Calkins, Illinois Brick and its Legislative
Aftermath, 47 ANTrrausT L.J. 967 (1978); Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUPA. L. Rev.
1363, 1424 (1978). See also, Note, Treble Damages and the Indirect Purchaser Problem:
Consideration for a Congressional Overturning of Illinois Brick, 39 Omo ST. L. J. 543
(1978).
63. See S. Rep. No. 239, 96th Cong., 1st Sees. (1979).
64. S. 300 would apply to any action pending on the date of enactment of the bill or
which is commenced on or after that date, except for the provisions permitting a passing-
on defense, which apply only to cases filed on or after the date of enactment.
65. See [Jan.-June] ANTTrusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 946 at A-11 (Jan. 10,
1980).
66. H.R. 2060, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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Prescribing Offensive Passing-On
A. Improper Denial of Compensation
Situations may arise which factual patterns would result in
a conflict of the dual objectives of private antitrust enforcement:
compensation of victims of antitrust violations and deterrence of
those violations.
When the two objectives have come into conflict, however, we be-
lieve that the achievement of the goals of the antitrust laws re-
quires that deterrence be preferred. If most antitrust violations
were deterred, the occasions for compensation would be few. The
converse is not true: even if the victims of antitrust overcharges
were fully reimbursed, the social inefficiencies of the violations
would persist. Therefore, the rule of Illinois Brick is preferable if
...it better deters antitrust violations than the alternative rule
even though it denies full compensation to some persons harmed
by the violations . 7
This argument appears eminently reasonable, until one con-
siders the fundamental unfairness and arguable illegality of de-
nying compensation to "some persons harmed by the viola-
tions." Surely this is a suprisingly disdainful attitude in view of
the language of section 4 which express purpose is to compen-
sate "any person who shall be injured .... "s Further, this
conclusory proposition distorts the practical consequences of the
Illinois Brick rule in a way which suggests that the denials of
compensation will be few and those few will be of little quantita-
67. Landes & Posner supra note 1, at 605.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (emphasis added). The conclusory proposition distorts the practi-
cal consequences of the Illinois Brick rule in a way which suggests that denials of com-
pensation will be few and those few will be of little qualitative significance. The argu-
ment concedes that the Illinois Brick rule "denies full compensation to some persons
harmed . . ." This characterization of the rule implies that "some" persons will receive a
quantum of compensation which is less than "full." In actual fact, a strict application of
the rule entails a denial of any compensation to the entire class of persons who are in-
jured by an antitrust violation unless those persons enjoy the privileged status of direct
purchasers. The distribution chain of goods and services being what it is, there can be
little doubt that the number of indirect purchasers from conspiratorial price fixers will
almost certainly be many times larger than the number of direct purchasers. None of
these indirect purchasers will receive any compensation under Illinois Brick, no matter
how grave the injury. At the very least it seems misleading to characterize such a state of
affairs as a denial of "full" compensation to "some" persons. Probably a more accurate
characterization would be a denial of "all" compensation to "most" persons.
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tive significance. The argument concedes that the Illinois Brick
rule "denies full compensation to some persons harmed ...."
This characterization of the rule implies that "some" persons
(i.e. a small number) will receive a quantum of compensation
which is less than "full." In fact, a strict application of the rule
entails a denial of any compensation (however small) to the en-
tire class of persons who are injured by an antitrust violation
unless those persons enjoy the privileged status of direct pur-
chasers. The distribution chain of goods and services, being what
it is, there can be little doubt that the number of indirect pur-
chasers from conspiratorial price fixers will almost certainly be
many times larger than the number of direct purchasers. Every
one of these indirect purchasers will receive zero compensation
under Illinois Brick, no matter how grave the injury. At the very
least it seems misleading to characterize such a state of affairs as
a denial of "full" compensation to "some" persons. Probably a
more accurate characterization would be a denial of "all" com-
pensation to "most" persons.
Even ignoring the patent unfairness of the Illinois Brick
rule and its blatent disregard for the compensatory objective of
section 4, the argument purporting to justify the rule on the ba-
sis of its deterrent efficacy is logically defective. The first justifi-
cation is indubitably true: "If most antitrust violations were de-
terred, the occasions for compensation would be few."0 9 The
proposition which follows, however, fails to recognize that the
full reimbursement to the victim of antitrust overcharges is not
exacted from some third party such as an insurer. In fact, reim-
bursement is governed by section 4 and compels the violator to
disgorge treble the amount of pecuniary harm he inflicted on his
victim. This statutory requirement has three implications which,
when considered as a form of syllogism, are seen to simultane-
ously promote the dual objectives of section 4:
(1) Enforcement of treble damage claims of all persons injured
within the meaning of section 4 will produce the result that the
violator must satisfy judgments against him in amounts exceeding
his unlawful exactions.
(2) By undertaking any rational benefit/cost calculation prior to
committing an antitrust violation a potential violator will per-
69. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 605.
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ceive that the expected costs to himself, in the form of treble
damage awards incurred because of a price-fixing violation of sec-
tion 4, exceed the expected benefits to himself, or the unlawful
overcharge, flowing from the violation.
(3) The outcome of the rational benefit/cost calculation will in-
dicate to the potential violator that his interests are better served
by not violating the antitrust laws.
Thus, we have the result that if the compensation objective
of section 4 is enforceable by all persons injured, wherever they
may be situated in the distribution chain, the threat of damages
resulting from that enforcement will ipso facto deter inchoate
violations. This line of reasoning reconciles the supposed "con-
flict" between the two objectives of the antitrust laws adverted
to by Landes and Posner. Moreover, to the extent that the likeli-
hood of treble damage awards deters potential antitrust viola-
tors, the "social inefficiencies" generated by these violations will
fail to materialize.
Two respected commentators, Landes and Posner, have pro-
duced an ingenious argument to support their contention that
the Illinois Brick rule will not result in uncompensated harm to
indirect purchasers:
An antitrust claim is equivalent to a valuable, though risky, asset
that includes a zero recovery as one possible outcome. Under Illi-
nois Brick, the entire antitrust claim, including the possible zero
recovery outcome, is vested in the direct purchaser. Indirect pur-
chasers are compensated for relinquishing their legal claims by
being charged lower prices. The risk of antitrust litigation is
borne by the direct purchaser, who may or may not realize a re-
turn on his legal claim, while indirect purchasers receive a certain
benefit based on the anticipated value of the claim. 0
The authors fail to mention that the "risky asset", consisting of
the antitrust claim, includes not only a "zero recovery as one
possible outcome," but includes another possible outcome con-
sisting of substantial losses representing attorneys' fees and
other litigation costs which are not recoverable should the plain-
tiff fail to establish liability. Thus, the "riskiness" is really a
double-edged sword entailing possible heavy losses as well as a
70. Id. at 606.
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zero recovery or a treble damage award. In the face of this un-
certainty, Landes and Posner impute to the management of the
direct purchaser an implausible pricing policy: prudent and well
informed managers of such purchasers will intentionally set the
price to their customers at a level lower than that necessary to
generate a satisfactory margin of sales revenue over costs.
Landes and Posner argue that they are willing to suffer this im-
mediate self-inflicted harm because of their expectation of a
compensatory treble damage award, despite being aware that
their firm might incur even greater losses in the form of unre-
covered litigation costs should they lose the lawsuit. It is hard to
imagine an actual board of directors of an actual corporation
countenancing such speculative behavior.71 Elementary consider-
ations of the time value of money suggest that a pricing policy of
the kind described above is likely to be contraindicated strongly
by net present value budgetary calculations. Even if the
probability of a positive recovery is favorable, the management
is still faced with the prospect of deliberately incurring near
term losses, such as sub-optimal rates of return discounted at
relatively low discount rates, in anticipation of a possible large
cash award to be enjoyed in the indeterminate future and hence
subject to relatively larger discounting. It is by no means obvi-
ous that these capital-budgeting type calculations will support
the sort of pricing policy described by Landes and Posner. In-
deed, if the firm's cost-of-capital is high,72 it will use a high dis-
count rate resulting in net present value calculations unlikely
1
71. There is a persuasive argument that can be made that, if the managing directors
of a corporation were to pass on to the corporation's customers an as yet unrealized
antitrust award, they might subsequently be adjudged to have failed to discharge their
statutorily prescribed duty of due care; for this failure they would be jointly and sever-
ally liable to the corporation for the benefit of its shareholders or creditors. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §§ 717, 720 (McKinney 1963).
72. The cost of capital to a firm represents a minimal acceptable rate of return on
an investment. See, e.g., K.K. SEo & B. WINGE, MANAGERI AL ECONOmiCS 370 (1979).
This is virtually a universal standard for choosing among new investment opportunities.
"The cost of capital is the discount rate for the present value method for evaluating
proposed investment projects." Id. See, e.g., T.. HAnSrOrNEs & J. ROTIWELL, INTRODuc-
TION TO MANAGERL EcoNoMIcs 397 (1979). As a general rule, high costs of capital are
indicia of firms experiencing difficulty in attracting new debt or equity financing. To the
extent that such firms are more likely than others to be direct-purchaser victims of
price-fixing conspiracies, they will have concomitantly greater incentives to avoid the
kind of price-reduction pass-along of a damages award.
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supporting a pricing policy of suffer now and prosper later.
In short, considerations of prudent business criteria statu-
tory prescriptions, and available empirical evidence, imply that
when the direct-purchaser victims of a price-fixing conspiracy
determine prices to their own customers, they are mindful of the
practical advice offered by Bertrand Russell:
"Since, broadly speaking the distant consequences of actions are
more uncertain than the immediate consequences, it is seldom
justifiable to embark on any policy on the ground that, though
harmful in the present it will be beneficial in the long run."' 3
Landes and Posner have qualified their theory: "Of course
some buyers (i.e. direct purchasers) may not anticipate, and thus
take account of, possible antitrust recoveries in their purchasing
decisions. To the extent that they do not, the force of the fore-
going argument is lessened."' 4 This article contends that even if
buyers do anticipate an antitrust recovery, they are unlikely to
reflect this anticipation in their own price setting policies.
In summary, the combination of generalized risk aversion
common among businessmen 5 and the methodology of capital
budgeting 6 work to reinforce each other to ensure that instances
of the pricing policy posited by Landes and Posner will rarely
occur. If that is true then, by their own concession, 7 that their'
argument is vitiated. One is left with the alternative and more
73. B. RussELL, PHILOSOPHY AND PoLTcsI m THE BASIC WRMNGS OF BERTRNmD
RUSSELL 465 (Egner & Denonn eds. 1961).
74. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 607.
75. For evidence that businessmen typically are risk-avoiders, see Breit & Elzinga,
Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Towards Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HAv. L.
REv. 693 704-06 (1973).
76. For evidence that the methodology of capital budgeting calculations would tend
to discourage a pricing policy in which a firm passed on to its customers in the form of a
lower price the pecuniary benefits it expected to derive by prosecuting a treble-damages
claim against price-fixers, see Erickson, The Profitability of Violating the Antitrust
Laws: Dissolution and Treble Damages in Private Antitrust Litigation 5 ANTrMusT L.
& EcoN. RaV. 101, 104-109 (1962). Professor Erickson concluded that antitrust violators
often profit by their wrong doing despite incurring treble damage liability, partly because
of the failure of awards to reflect adequately the time value of money. In effect, the
victims of a conspiracy are placed in the same position as one who is compelled to extend
a "loan" to the price-fixers, the "interest" on which, in the form of a subsequently se-
cured treble damages award, constitutes a grossly inadequate "return" on the loaned
funds.
77. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 607.
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plausible conclusion that the price increases engineered by a
price-fixing conspiracy are disseminated throughout the distri-
bution chain.
B. Deterrence Dilution
The previous section of this article argued that a reversal of
the Illinois Brick rule will compensate persons section 4 was
designed to protect and, as a consequence of that extension of
protection, its deterrence objective will be furthered. This sec-
tion of the article will argue that the Illinois Brick rule barring
the use of offensive passing-on dilutes the deterrent efficacy of
the antitrust laws independently of its denial of compensation to
many injured persons.
First, consider specifically what is meant by private prose-
cution of treble damage claims serving to deter antitrust viola-
tions. At the most general level of discourse, deterrence is con-
cerned with influencing the choices of one group, consisting of
potential antitrust violators, by forecasting the behavior of an-
other group consisting of all persons likely to be injured by the
violation. This involves adducing reasons for the first group to
believe that the behavior of the second group will be determined
by the first group's behavior.
There are several key elements which characterize effective
deterrence. A threat must be credible to be effective; its credibil-
ity may depend on the costs and risks associated with fulfillment
for the persons making the threat. A retaliatory threat, such as a
threat to file a treble damages claim, is likely to be more credible
if the means of carrying it out are placed in the hands of those
whose resolution is the strongest. A self-evident proposition, fre-
quently overlooked, is that the rationality of the person to be
deterred is pertinent to the efficacy of a threat, and that exces-
sively myopic potential violators, like lunatics and children,
often cannot be controlled by threats.
These considerations, and others, are relevant to an analysis
of the Illinois Brick rule because the majority opinion based this
rule on this proposition: Allowing the use of offensive passing-on
would reduce the overall deterrent efficacy of antitrust enforce-
ment because the right to sue would be divided among more
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parties thereby reducing each parties claim.78 The court thought
this would diminish the deterrent efficacy of the threat of pri-
vate treble damage claims because the amounts recoverable by
the claimants were too small to induce a vigorous prosecution of
meritorious claims. The Court went on to state:
We are unwilling to carry the compensation ... principle to
its logical extreme by attempting to allocate... damages among
all 'those within the defendant's chain of ... distribution,'...
especially because we... question the extent to which such an
attempt would... make individual victims whole for actual inju-
ries... suffered rather than simply depleting the overall ... re-
covery in litigation over pass-on issues e
The Court regarded this possibility of "depleting the overall
recovery" as one which would reduce the deterrent efficacy of
private treble damage actions to an impermissible degree. 80
The Court's reasoning has been discussed in extenso be-
cause of the intention to dissect and test its validity through an
application of modern tools of conflict and deterrence analysis
and game theory. Prior to undertaking this analysis, however,
several technical concepts must be defined. First, if the Supreme
Court is correct in its supposition that "indirect purchasers
would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and hence little incen-
tive to sue," is it possible that a reversal of the Illinois Brick
rule might promote deterrence, notwithstanding the small incen-
tive of indirect purchasers to vindicate their newly conferred
standing? The answer to this question is determined by the ef-
fect of the rule on the "rationality" of violators and victims.
Suppose the class of potential antitrust violators is defined
as consisting of those firms each of which would expect to enjoy
an increase in profits if they successfully effect a price-fixing
conspiracy.81 This definition embodies the notion of expected
78. Quoting Hanover Shoe, the Court in Illinois Brick stated. "[U]nless direct pur-
chasers were allowed to sue for the portion of the overcharge arguably passed on to indi-
rect purchasers, antitrust violators 'would retain the fruits of their illegality' because
indirect purchasers 'would have only a tiny stake in the lawsuit' and hence little incen-
tive to sue." Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 725-26 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United States Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. at 494).
79. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 746-47 (citation omitted).
80. Id.
81. There are many conditions in particular markets which are conducive to collu-
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profits as the focus of the firm's concern. The analysis method
applied here examines the ways in which changes in firms' ex-
pected profits will augment or diminish the deterrent efficacy of
the treble damage remedy under the Illinois Brick rule.82 The
expectational calculus is the operational embodiment of the re-
quirement of "rationality" alluded to in the discussion of the
key elements of deterrence.83
When the victim of a price-fixing conspiracy threatens to
bring a lawsuit under section 4, the threat is only a communica-
tion of one person's incentives, designed to impress on another
the automatic consequences of his act. There is a special wrin-
kle, however, in the case of an indirect purchaser. Assume, argu-
endo, that indirect purchasers are not barred from bringing
suit." Assume also that the Supreme Court is correct in suppos-
ing that the class of indirect purchasers is very numerous and, as
a consequence, the treble damages recoverable by any individual
plaintiff are very small. Assume, finally, that the facts of the
previous assumptions are common knowledge to all potential an-
titrust violators as well as to their potential victims, wherever
situated in the distribution chain. These three assumptions
bring into stark clarity the distinctive feature of the threat
which may be posed by indirect purchasers. The nature of this
threat is that the threatener, the indirect purchaser, has no in-
centive to carry it out either before the violation, when there is
no meritorious claim, or after the violation, when the treble
damage recovery is small and the net effect on the plaintiff's
financial resources may be negative.85
sive behavior in price fixing. The analysis undertaken in this article is sufficiently general
to encompass the panoply of structural and behavioral characteristics thereby obviating
a recital of specific conditions presumed to prevail For a thorough discussion of these
conditions, see, e.g., F. M. SCHERER, CoNDrrToNs FACILITATING OLIGOPOLISTIC COORDINA-
TION IN INDUSTRIAL PRICING (1972).
82. The term "expected profits" is used to indicate that conspirators' actual profits,
whatever they may be, must be adjusted to reflect the facts that the violation may be
detected and, if detected, the violators may be held liable for a treble damages award.
See R. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 360 (1972).
83. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
84 This may occur, for example, if Congress legislatively overrules Illinois Brick, or
if the Supreme Court seizes the earliest opportunity to reverse itself.
85. Much of the following analysis consists of an adaptation of a general theory of
deterrence eloquently and cogently expatiated in T. C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICT Passim (1963).
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There are rather subtle psychological dynamics at work here
which result in some interesting propositions. First, the indirect
purchaser does have an incentive to bind himself to fulfill the
threat to sue, if he thinks that the threat may be successful, be-
cause the threat rather than its fulfillment gains the end. Sec-
ond, fulfillment is not required if the threat succeeds. Third, and
perhaps most important, the more certain the contingent fulfill-
ment is, the less likely and the less necessary the actual fulfill-
ment becomes.8" This notion of contingent fulfillment consti-
tutes the means by which we supply operational meaning to the
potential violators' expected profits.
In order to apply the game theory analytical mechanism to
the adversarial relationship existing between the group of poten-
tial violators and their indirect-purchaser victims, we must build
a model which accommodates the presumption that the damages
recoverable by individual indirect purchaser/plaintiffs under sec-
tion 4 are so small that their "threat" to sue may not be be-
lieved. The threat's efficacy depends on the credulity of the po-
tential violators, and the threat will be ineffectual unless the
indirect purchasers can convince the potential violators that
there is reason to expect that the threat will be carried out.
The deterrent threat posed by indirect purchasers has some
quantitative characteristics which give rise to the propositions
discussed above. It is not necessary that the threat to sue should
promise more damage to the party threatened than to the party
carrying it out. In the case of an indirect purchaser suit, the
non-recoverable costs of litigation may so far exceed the recover-
able damages that even a successfully prosecuted claim will
harm the plaintiff more than the defendant.8 7 Indeed, this possi-
86. Professor Schelling makes the point that in ordinary language:
"threat" is often used also for the case in which one merely points out to an ad-
versary, or reminds him, that one would take action painful to the adversary if the
latter fails to comply, it being clear that one would have an incentive to do so.
Id.
Schelling suggests the use of the word "warning" rather than "threat" for these sorts
of cases. In the case being considered here that of an indirect-purchaser who is the vic-
tim of a price fixing conspiracy, the concept of "threat" not "warning" is the appropriate
model because, if the implicit "threat" of a treble damages claim does not deter the
violation, the tiny or perhaps negative "recovery" expected by the indirect-purchaser/
plaintiff would not constitute an incentive to fulfill the "threat."
87. The most significant of the indirect purchaser's non-recoverable litigation costs
19821
27
PACE LAW REVIEW
bility was the basis of the Court's supposition that indirect pur-
chasers would have little, if any, incentive to sue.
Deterrence power does not depend upon the size of the
threat. A threat is only "too large" if its very size interferes with
its credibility. The analytical lynchpin, then, is credibility.
Under what circumstances would the group of potential violators
forbear from price fixing because they expected or believed that
the consequence of their price-fixing scheme would be one or
more treble damage suits from indirect purchasers? The circum-
stances conducive to this expectation are revealed in the game
theory paradigm.88
The basic concept of game theory is that of the payoff ma-
trix, of which the following description is typical:
A game is a situation in which we have a certain number of par-
ties each of which is capable of assuming one out of a given num-
ber of positions or choices. The outcome or the payoff of the
game is the set of rewards or penalties accruing to each party at
each combination of positions of all the parties."9
The payoff matrix representing the "game" to be "played"
by potential violators and indirect purchasers is illustrated
below:, 0
are manifest as opportunity costs such as diversion of managerial attention and effort,
possible disruptions of sources of supply, and missed opportunities to expand the firm's
activities in new or established markets because the funds required to finance the expan-
sion were diverted to underwrite the pending lawsuit. In addition, there may be large
discretionary expenditures undertaken by the plaintiff in the form of expert witness fees,
fees paid to consultants to conduct markets surveys, and costs of electronic data storage
and retrieval; all or some of which the court may disallow as recoverable under section 4.
This is especially likely to be the case if the discretionary expenditures do not lead to
evidence admitted at the trial. And, of course, none of the litigation costs are recoverable
should the indirect purchaser lose at trial The risk of this latter contingency must be
counted as a cost. Finally, there is the time value of all litigation expenses which is usu-
ally not awarded as costs.
88. The game-theory approach and the accompanying analytical paradigm are adap-
tations of the work of T. Schelling, supra note 85, at 178-182.
89. K. BOULDMG, CONtaCT & DsNSE 41 (1963).
90. This payoff matrix represents the choices available to the potential violators.
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Do Not
m Sue
Row 1
Sue
2! Row 2
TABLE 1
Potential Violater's Choices
Column 1 Column 2
Do Not Fix Prices Fix Prices
0
0
0 -X
0 -Y
In choosing a course of action, the potential violators choose
a column and thereafter the ball is in the other party's court.
After observing what the potential violators' choice has been,
the indirect purchasers individually make their own choice. Each
firm in the group of indirect purchasers may choose to forbear
from bringing an action, or may file a treble damages claim. The
values of the consequences to each party from each of the four
pairs of choices are indicated in the corresponding column/row
intersections. The consequence to the potential violators appears
in the northeast corner of each box and the consequence to the
indirect purchaser appears in the soutwest corner.'1 X and Y are
positive numbers.
This game-theory paradigm has been adapted to represent
the problem faced by the group of indirect purchasers in mount-
ing a credible threat. If the potential violator foregoes any price-
fixing scheme, the indirect purchaser's optimal choice is to for-
bear from filing a claim.92 If the potential violator does in fact
91. Since the analysis depends only on comparisons of the differences between abso-
lute valuations of the payoffs for the two players separately, no generality is lost by
adopting, for each participant, a scale of measurement that sets his most preferred
payoff equal to 1 and his next preferred payoff equal to 0. That is to say, these are
ordinal rankings of outcomes for each participant and need not represent dollar num-
bers. Nor need they be comparable between players. In the language of game theory we
are here dealing with a non-constant sum game. For more on the interpretation of these
numbers see A. A. Alchian, The Meaning of Utility Measurement, 43 AA. ECON. RzV. 26
(1953) or R. D. Luca & H. RAnnA, GAnS AaND EcIsIoNs 12-38 (1967).
92. It must be assumed that if one or more indirect purchasers brings a treble dam-
ages action against innocent parties, such a proceeding would not impose substantial
costs on defendants because the procedural means of accelerating judgments or a rapidly
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engage in an effective price-fixing conspiracy, however, both the
conspirator and the indirect-purchaser victim perceive that the
optimal choice of the indirect purchaser remains a decision not
to sue. If he does sue, the small treble damages recovered will be
exceeded by the non-recoverable costs of litigation.93 Conse-
quently, he is in a worse position than if he had passively acqui-
esced. This hypothetical embodies the Supreme Court's supposi-
tion that each indirect purchaser anticipates such a tiny treble
damage recovery that he will have little incentive to sue
violators."
The distribution of payoffs within the cells of the payoff
matrix is characterized by nomenclature peculiar to game the-
ory. In the payoff matrix illustrated, we see that for any pair of
choices which determines the set of payoffs, the gain or loss to
one player is not necessarily equal to the loss or gain of the
other player. This sort of game is known as a "variable sum
game" meaning that "the variable sum game is one in which the
sum of the* payoffs in each box of the matrix is not constant."' 5
In short, the variable sum game does not conform to the Duch-
ess' Law, one of the asseverations of the Duchess in Alice in
Wonderland - "The more there is of yours, the less there is of
mine."
In a variable sum game, there is a curious amalgam of coop-
eration and conflict engendering some very significant policy im-
plications of antitrust enforcement. There is opportunity for co-
operation between the players because both of them will be
better off within a certain range of solutions. But there are also
agreed upon settlement, will dispose of the claim without significant harm to defendants.
Plaintiffs would have to bear, however, all the costs of bringing a claim dismissed on the
merits, or one settled on terms disadvantageous to plaintiffs.
93. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
94. The paradigm designed in this article exaggerates the Supreme Court's supposi-
tion. The game-theory format analyzes the strongest possible case which would support
the Court's reasoning, namely, that in which the stake of indirect purchasers is not
merely tiny but actually negative. If it can be shown that even under these extreme
conditions the threat of lawsuits brought by indirect purchasers may constitute a signifi-
cant deterrent to antitrust violations, then deterrence will be strengthened when indirect
purchasers anticipate a tiny positive stake.
95. K. BOULDINo, supra note 89, at 44.
For a lucid survey of the nature of variable-sum game theory and its applicability to
the analysis of antitrust conspiracies see P. Ascn, ECONOMIC THEoRy AND THE ANTI-
TRusT DzmMNA 66-82 (1970).
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loci of conflict because the distribution of total benefit between
the two players depends on the particular solution adopted.
Thus, while both parties are interested in establishing some so-
lution, they have divergent interests regarding the particular so-
lution adopted.
Applying these general propositions to the antitrust payoff
matrix, it can be seen that the potential violators and their indi-
rect purchasers have compatible incentives to avoid choices
which are likely to result in mutually harmful payoffs, repre-
sented by the box in the lower right of the figure." Given that
one of the other three boxes will constitute a "solution", how-
ever, the interests of the two players in choosing among these
solutions are inimical.
How is a "solution" arrived at? Further, is this solution in
furtherance of antitrust enforcement? Specifically, what will a
game-theoretic analysis reveal about deterrent efficacy under al-
ternative rules governing the standing of indirect purchasers?
1. Solutions under the Illinois Brick rule
Under the Illinois Brick rule no elaborate analysis is re-
quired because the "solution", namely the choices of each player
and the consequent payoffs, are preordained.
The Illinois Brick rule abrogates the indirect purchaser's
power to choose a course of action, or to threaten to do so.
Whichever choice the potential violators make, the indirect pur-
chaser is barred from pursuing a legal remedy. Inasmuch as this
constraint is known to the potential violators, they are free to
choose a course of action which will yield the most preferred
payoff of those available in the top row. Evidently, there is an
incentive for the potential violators to engage in a price-fixing
conspiracy which obtains the most preferred payoff.
This conclusory proposition does not imply that the judicial
inhibitions imposed on indirect purchasers under the Illinois
Brick rule will always provoke a price-fixing conspiracy when
there is economic incentive to do so. Presumably the direct pur-
chasers, to the extent that they are actually harmed by a price-
fixing conspiracy, can be expected to seek compensation through
96. See payoff matrix, supra text accompanying note 90.
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treble damage actions. Illinois Brick did not impair the abilities
of direct purchasers to detect antitrust violations nor did it in-
troduce any new procedural or substantive legal obstacles to the
vindication of direct purchasers' rights. The game-theory analy-
sis applied here to explore the deterrent implications of the Illi-
nois Brick rule will not yield a definitive and unambiguous con-
clusion predicting the actual conduct of potential violators.
Rather, the analysis will reveal how the presence or absence of a
class of potential plaintiffs will affect the incentives perceived by
potential violators. 7 In this sense, the payoffs in the game ma-
trix may be interpreted as marginal contributions to deterrence
which may tip the balance of the incentive structure one way or
the other. This hypothetical implies that, assuming all other in-
fluences are equiponderant, the marginal effect of the Illinois
Brick rule tends to weaken deterrent efficacy of the antitrust
laws.
2. Consequences of a reversal of the Illinois Brick rule
If the Supreme Court or Congress reverses the Illinois Brick
rule to confer standing on indirect purchasers, the scope of
game-theory analysis is enlarged. The conditions of this game
hypothetical allow two choices to each player, thereby introduc-
ing into the game considerations of rationality. Here, the notion
of saliency must be considered as a determinant of conflict reso-
lution in a variable-sum game.°8 The application of saliency en-
tails a recognition that the enlarged scope of the game-theory
97. The conclusions in the text should be understood as reflecting marginal criteria
for policy choices. The payoff matrix representing the variable sum game "played" by
potential violators and indirect purchasers is predicated upon the solution to another
game played by the potential violators and the direct purchasers. The potential violators'
optimal strategy as determined by the solution of the latter game is implicitly subsumed
in the payoff matrix of the indirect purchaser game. The particular payoffs to the poten-
tial violators in the indirect purchaser game represent incremental or marginal conse-
quences which reflect whatever course of action may be chosen by direct purchasers.
Expressed in formal game-theory terminology, one can calculate the payoff "solution"
which potential violators can expect to realize in the direct purchaser game and then
subtract those expected payoffs from the aggregate payoffs resulting from each combina-
tion of choices in the indirect purchaser game. Therefore, the payoffs in the matrix de-
picted in the text should be interpreted as marginal effects on the welfare of potential
violators resulting from each combination of choices in the indirect purchaser game.
98. For illustrations of the principle of saliency at work in a variety of conflict situa-
tions see T. C. SCHm.UG, supra note 85, at 54-67.
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analysis affords opportunities for bargaining. The term 'bargain-
ing' is used here in a special sense. An indirect purchaser rela-
tionship involves a scenario in which the parties will probably
not engage in any sort of explicit communications of threats,
warnings, or promises. Galienay's importance in contributing to
the solution of this bargaining problem stems ,from the fact that
these bargains are frequently struck with no communication be-
tween the bargainers; simply the tacit observation by both par-
ties of some salient feature of the situation makes both parties
settle on that salient feature.
In the case being analyzed, the salient feature which com-
mands the attention of the potential violators is their expecta-
tion of treble damage claims. I have already alluded to the in-
ability of individual indirect purchasers to convey a credible
threat owing to the self-inflicted harm connected with the carry-
ing out of the threat.9 9 When dealing with a population of poten-
tial indirect-purchaser victims, however, the dual dimensions of
a threat assume a statistical significance. As one author states:
The importance of a threat in the mind of the threatened,
that is, the likelihood that it will make him change his behavior
in the manner desired by the threatener, has two dimensions: one,
the magnitude of the threat itself, that is, the prospective disutil-
ity to the threatened party if the threat is carried out, (i.e. -X)
and the other, the subjective probability in the mind of the
threatened party that the threat will, in fact, be carried out. We
could presumably define these quantities so that the importance
of the threat was equal to its magnitude multiplied by its subjec-
tive probability.200
This is an operational definition of rationality which I will
adapt to the particular characteristics of the payoff matrix con-
fronting the group of potential violators. We impute to the po-
tential violators the willingness and the capacity to calculate
their expected payoffs arising from each of the two courses of
action. These expected payoffs are calculated according to the
formula prescribed for assessing the "importance" of a threat.' 10
99. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
100. K. BOULDINO, supra note 89, at 225.
101. The expression "expected payoff", sometimes "expected relative valued", is
standard statistical terminology. The "expected relative value" of a strategy is simply a
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The numerical magnitudes associated with each of the expected
payoffs are the salient indicia of the conflict resolution mecha-
nism. They are the potential violators' guides to an optimal
strategy. If the potential violators conduct themselves rationally,
they will pursue their own self-interest, and choose whichever
course of action yields the most attractive expected payoff.102
Two distinct possibilities present themselves when contem-
plating the calculations which potential violators will undertake.
First, if the potential violators choose to effectuate a conspiracy,
they will be sued by direct purchaser victims or by one of the
antitrust enforcement agencies. The possibility of such lawsuits
is'a significant factor to be considered, regardless of whether the
conspiracy provokes litigation by indirect purchasers. If the po-
tential violators estimate the likelihood of a direct purchaser/
enforcement agency lawsuit resulting in an adverse judgement,
this estimate is symbolized by 1-P. The symbol P1 represents
the potential violators' subjective probability that they may ef-
fect a price-fixing conspiracy with impunity.1 03
The second possibility which potential violators must con-
sider is that one or more indirect-purchaser victims may bring
treble damages actions notwithstanding the disincentive re-
weighted sum of the relative values of the consequences, where the weights are the re-
spective probabilities of the consequences occurring if the strategy is adopted and used
by the decision maker. P. FisaBuRN, DECISION AND VALUE THEORY 12 (1964). The mea-
surement of the "importance" of a threat is simply an instance of employing different
language to designate an expected payoff calculation.
102. The concept of rationality employed in this paper is consonant with modern
theories of conflict resolution. For example, Schelling's description of the attributes of
rationality: "What kind of rationality is required of the party to be detered - a
knowledge of his own value system, and ability to perceive alternatives and to calculate
with probabilities . ." T. C. SCHEMING, supra note 85, at 14. Indeed, this concept of
rationality was endorsed more than half century ago by Frank Knight in his seminal
work. He wrote: "It is correct to treat all instances of economic uncertainty as cases of
choice between a small reward more confidently and a larger one less confidently antici-
pated." F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AN) PRoFT 237 (1927). A practical method of
institutionalizing the notion of "rationality," and in fact the one employed in this article,
was designed specifically for a game-theory type of analysis. Its original statement can be
found in J. YON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAV-
IOR (1953). For a practical application of this methodology to pricing strategy see P.E.
GREE, APPLICATIONS OF DECISION THEORY IN PRICING STRATEGY IN PRICES: ISSUES IN THE-
ORY, PRACTICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (A. Phillips & 0. Williamson eds. 1967).
103. The probability P, consists of a number between zero and one which represents
the potential violator's perception or his degree of belief. It may, but need not, be deter-
mined by sophisticated data analysis techniques.
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vealed by the payoff matrix.104 When contemplating the behav-
ior of individual firms which are members of some larger popula-
tion of more or less homogeneous firms, it must be recognized
that all the members of that population will not behave with
strict uniformity. Generally, there will be strong common ten-
dencies, such as the tendency to avoid futile litigation. The laws
of probability imply, however, that some individuals in a popula-
tion will exhibit behavior varying from the "norm". If the num-
ber of indirect-purchaser victims is reasonably large it is almost
a statistical certainty that some will file treble damages claims.
This will happen despite the fact that from a purely pecuniary
point of view it is ostensibly against their self interest to do
SO. 1
05
What is the practical import of such vague terms as "rea-
sonably large" and "statistical uncertainty"? Let the symbol Nr
represent the probability that an indirect purchaser will not file
a treble damages claim against a price-fixing conspiracy. Fur-
ther, assume that the population of all indirect purchasers who
believe themselves to be adversely affected by the conspiracy
consists of N firms. Lastly, assume that the probability of for-
bearing to sue is assumed to be the same for each of the N firms
and that their litigation policies are independent of each other.
These assumptions will allow us to impute practical meanings to
vague statistical terminology such as "reasonably large" or a
"statistical certainty".
These assumptions imply that the probability of at least one
of the N indirect-purchaser victims will bring an action is calcu-
lated as 1 - in. If the disincentive for indirect purchasers to sue
is as strong as the Supreme Court supposes,"'e it is reasonable
for H to take on a value very close to 1, for example .99; in that
104. Payoff matrix, supra text accompanying note 90.
105. Although the empirical validity of this proposition depends on the workings of
the laws of probability, one may perhaps adduce plausible explanations for its apparent
counterintuitive flavor. It may be, for example, that a few indirect purchasers are more
interested in punishing a wrongdoer than they are in husbanding their resources. Alter-
natively, it may be that most, but not all, of the indirect-purchaser victims perceive the
true payoff matrix. Those few who do not may be mistakenly inflating the anticipated
payoff to themselves if they should sue a group of price-fixing conspirators. Still another
explanation may be that a Pyrrhic victory won today will obviate other such battles in
the future.
106. minois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 741-42.
1982]
35
PACE LAW REVIEW
case the probability that an indirect purchaser will sue a price-
fixer is one in a hundred. The table- below shows how the
probability of at least one indirect purchaser lawsuit changes as
the size of the population of indirect purchasers changes.
Table 2
Number of Potential
Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs
5
10
25
100
500
Probability of at Least
One Treble-Damage Action
.049
.095
.222
.633
.993
This table shows that even if each individual indirect pur-
chaser is strongly disinclined to sue, when their number becomes
"reasonably large", such as 100 firms, the probability that at
least one of them will prosecute a treble damages action is
nearly two thirds. Certainly this likelihood should be considered.
For example, when the population of indirect-purchaser victims
becomes very large, such as 500 or more firms, there is a
probability of 99.3% that at least one lawsuit will be initiated.10 7
107. Contrary to this position, an ingenious algebraic analysis was proposed by
Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 609-11, where the authors argue that indirect pur-
chasers are unlikely to sue because their numerosity hinders detection of violators in the
chain of distribution. This novel theory may have trouble convincing many courts, yet
their algebraic result is noteworthy. They show that if there are n "links" in the distribu-
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Suppose the symbol P designates the probability of at least one
treble damage action brought by indirect purchasers. At this
stage in the analysis it is unnecessary to fix a particular numeri-
cal magnitude to P2. Its role is that of a parameter in determin-
ing the efficacy of indirect purchaser deterrence. The magnitude
of P, represents the contingent fulhiient alluded to
previously. 0 8
When potential violators decide to effect a price-fixing con-
spiracy, choosing column 2 of the payoff matrix, they face two
possibilities. First, there is a probability, P1, that they will be
held liable for treble damages based on claims brought by direct
purchasers. Second, there is a probability, P. of liability for
treble damages on claims brought by indirect purchasers. The
indirect purchasers will respond to a conspiracy by choosing row
2 with probability P2 109 Alternatively, if the potential violators
do not engage in a price fixing conspiracy, choosing column 1,
they can be sure that none of their potential adversaries will se-
cure a judgment against them. When determining the marginal
deterrent effect on an indirect purchaser's incentive to sue, one
must ask: for any predetermined value of P, how large does P"
have to be to make the threat effective if the magnitude of P1
alone is not sufficiently large to ensure deterrence? '1 ° This is a
question of the potential violators' choice when confronted with
the incremental risk P2 . According to the payoff matrix,1 ' if the
potential violators choose column 1 they receive 0. If they choose
column 2 their expectation is a weighted average of 1 and -X,
tion chain and two firms at each of the links, the total number of indirect purchasers is
n. See id. at 611 n. 24. If there are k firms at each link the number of indirect purchas-
ers is n * n- k + 1. These formulas suggest that the population of indirect purchas-
2 2
era might be very large even in a chain with few links where there are as many as half a
dozen firms at each link, meaning that the likelihood of at least one indirect purchaser
treble damages action will usually be significant enough to cause potential violators to
take it into account in planning their optimal strategy.
108. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
109. Payoff matrix, supra text accompanying note 90.
110. If P, is large enough to constitute a completely effective deterrent, then the
marginal contribution to deterrent efficacy of indirect purchaser threats must be zero
Such an extreme case is one of little practical importance in view of the 3,897 direct
purchaser cases filed in district courts between 1969 and 1978. See Landes & Posner,
supra note 1, at 633.
111. Payoff matrix, supra text accompanying note 90.
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with weights of (1-P) and P, respectively. If this average is less
than 0, they are motivated to choose column 1, subject to the
precondition P that they will choose column 2 anyway because
the anticipation of the likelihood of direct purchaser or enforce-
ment agency lawsuits is too small to constitute an effective de-
terrent regardless of what the indirect purchasers decide to do.
The condition for an effective threat is thus:
0 > (1-P) - P 2X
This can be rewritten as:
1
Inequality (1) P2 > 1+x
We have assumed that any threat with P2 above the floor
established by the formula symbolized as inequality (1) above
may still fail to deter with probability P.. Conversely, the con-
spirators will be deterred with probability 1-P. If the indirect
purchasers' threat succeeds, their payoff is +1. If it fails, their
expectation is a weighted average of 0 and -Y, their weights be-
ing (1-P) and P2 respectively. Thus, the expected payoff to the
indirect purchasers, when the threat is large enough to be effec-
tive is given by:
(1-P)1 + Px[(1-P2) 0 + P, (-Y)] = 1-P - PP 2Y
The right hand side of the equation above shows that the ex-
pected payoff to indirect purchasers becomes larger as P. dimin-
ishes. The indirect purchasers will anticipate the maximum fea-
sible expected payoff, their most preferred expectation, when P.
assumes the smallest numerical value.which satisfies inequality
(1). A worthwhile threat must have an expected value greater
than 0, which is what the indirect purchasers can expect from
this particular payoff matrix under a strict application of the Il-
linois Brick rule. To have an expected value greater than 0, the
numerical value of P2 must satisfy the condition:
1 - P - P 1P 2Y > 0
This can be rewritten as:
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Inequality (2) - > P2
Thus we see that inequality (1) and inequality (2) re-
present lower and upper bounds on the value of P2. These two
inequalities determine the effective range of P, as:
1 <p < -P 1
1+x P1  y
If it should happen that there is no room between the lower
bound and the upper bound, then the threat posed by indirect
purchasers is nugatory. Symbolically, this condition translates
as:
Inequality (3) ..L > I-P 1
1+x P
The frequency with which this condition is satisfied in real
world markets is left to the reader's conjecture. It may be worth-
while observing, however, that the numerical magnitudes of P
and X are likely to be positively correlated which would tend to
reduce the frequency of occurrence below what would be ex-
pected were the two independent of each other or negatively
correlated.11 2
Examination of inequality (2) reveals that the contingent
threat, or. the probability of an action by indirect purchasers,
will be effective if:
Inequality (4) 1 < Y1
Inequality (4).implies that if the harm suffered by indirect
purchasers as a consequence of bringing their treble damage ac-
112. An instance in which indirect purchasers would not represent a significant
threat is where P, - V and Y -1 + X; the likelihood of deterrence by direct purchas-
ers is 50% and the harm suffered by indirect purchasers consequent to bringing a "suc-
cessful" treble damages action, where non-recoverable costs exceed aggregate damages
recovered, exceeds the harm suffered by defendant conspiratois as a consequence of their
treble damages liability. Notice, however, that even if the respective harms to the parties
satisfy this condition, there may still be ample opportunity for indirect purchases to
consitute an efficacious threat if P, is small enough.
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tion exceeds the odds that the direct purchasers will successfully
deter, then the only kind of threat worthwhile for indirect pur-
chasers to make is a contingent one.113
Although the game-theory analysis employs a somewhat
austere model of the relations between potential antitrust viola-
tors and their indirect-purchaser victims, care has been taken to
construct the payoff matrix to reflect the real-world economic
incentives likely to be perceived by the participants when choos-
ing their optimal strategies. However, the model does not pur-
port to accurately predict the solution which would necessarily
happen in a real-world situation. The objective of this analysis
has been more modest: to reveal defects in the Court's reasoning
in Illinois Brick. Specifically, one fundamental premise upon
which the Court based its holding has been considered: that to
permit indirect purchasers to pursue a treble damages remedy
would weaken deterrence because the recovery available to di-
rect purchasers would be diminished, thereby reducing their in-
centive to act as private enforcers and, more importantly, that
the supposedly tiny damages recoverable by indirect purchasers
would not constitute sufficient incentive to induce them to act as
vigorous private enforcers.11'
The purpose of the game-theory analysis is to test the valid-
ity of the Court's premise. The payoff matrix reflects the eco-
nomic incentives which the Court hypothesized would diminish
deterrence. The chief conclusion which emerges from this analy-
sis is conditional: if the population of indirect purchaser victims
is "reasonably large," and if the indirect purchasers are permit-
ted to sue for damages, then a potential violator trying to maxi-
mize his expected benefits will perceive a marginal deterrent.
Thus, the Court's premise is not necessarily consistent with the
conduct of parties pursuing their self-interest in a rational or
expectation maximizing way.
This game-theory analysis does not imply that a reversal of
Illinois Brick will necessarily result in fewer price-fixing conspir-
113. Professor Schelling has addressed the problem posed in Inequality (4) and has
reached the same result as this Article, although he uses different terms, such as "frac-
tional threat" instead of "contingent threat." "Here is a case, then, in which the frac-
tional threat is superior to the certainty threat, and in which the latter could not be
worth making at all while the former were." T. C. SCHMLLNG, supra note 85, at 181.
114. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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acies. The analysis only indicates that under certain plausible
and commonplace conditions the effectiveness of direct pur-
chaser deterrence can be marginally augmented by indirect pur-
chasers. The practical import of this conclusion is that, if indi-
rect purchasers are permitted to invoke the doctrine of offensive
passing-on, the number of price-fixing conspiracies can be ex-
pected to be less than what it would be were indirect purchasers
barred from the courts.
C. Measurement of Damages
A third consequence of Illinois Brick concerns the condi-
tions under which firms will find opportunities to engage in
price-fixing conspiracies with relative immunity from antitrust
sanctions. This section of the article will argue that the rule pro-
scribing offensive passing-on may provide incentives for firms to
enter into horizontal and vertical relations whose consequences
for resource allocation and income distribution are indistin-
guishable from those of ordinary price-fixing conspiracies. Illi-
nois Brick sets up such incentives because it permits transac-
tions to be effected in such a way as to render them impervious
to attack by those firms, or consumers, who will ultimately bear
the burdens of monopolistic pricing and resource allocation.
The severest criticism to which the theory-of-the-firm has
been subjected by the courts is that it creates a credibility gap
between business as it is and as it is depicted by modem
microeconomic theory and articulately expressed in Illinois
Brick.
In Illinois Brick the Supreme Court critically commented
on the "array of simplifying assumptions" invoked by econo-
mists to apportion recovery among claimants at different levels
in the distribution chain.1 5 These simplifying assumptions are:
the market for the passer's product is perfectly competitive; the
overcharge is imposed equally on all competitors; and the passer
maximized profits.11 6 These assumptions were deemed by the
Court to be so at variance with perceived market reality as to
render the measurement theory based on them practically use-
115. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 741-42.
116. Id.
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less.17 It must be admitted that the Court's criticisms have
merit.1 8 The Court was correct in rejecting the methodology for
apportioning damages because it was based, in part, on the as-
sumption that the market for the passer's product is perfectly
competitive. The real world does not see many perfectly compet-
itive industries or many genuine monopolists, and economists
have been aware of this fact.'" The intermediate cases, those
where the litigating parties are neither perfect competitors nor
monopolists, are the ones usually before a court. The failure to
deal adequately and convincingly with these intermediate cases
has been interpreted to mean that microeconomic theory focuses
on the detailed solution of problems for nonexistent firms 2 °
Even with the defects exposed, economic theory still con-
tains value. If courts are to consider actual price and production
decisions and the resulting profits to the firms, the importance
of applying microeconomic theory to these subjects should not
be ignored. Despite long and vigorous debate on the theory and
117. In addition, the Court alluded to the "serious problem measuring the relevant
elasticities" as a means of supplying operational content to the apportioning measure-
ments. The elasticity issue, however, is one which can be raised in any private treble
damage action in which a direct purchaser is required to prove the extent of his recover-
able damages, such as lost profits. As a practical matter this means that the probative
value of elasticity studies may be placed in issue regardless of whether indirect purchas-
ers are permitted to invoke the doctrine of offensive passing-on. The evidentiary
problems raised by statistical elasticity studies may or may not be "serious" ones, but
there seems to be no logical reason for the courts to permit one class of injured persons,
direct purchasers, to use them and to deny another class of injured persons, indirect
purchasers, a forum because their use raises "serious problems." Such a distinction
seems, at the least, to arbitrarily foreclose an opportunity to indirect purchasers afforded
to direct purchasers.
118. The profit-maximization assumption, as well as the proferred substitutes, is the
subject of a number of studies. For some good surveys of what the economics profession
is complaining about and what is being done to rectify the complaints, see the following.
Alchian, The Basis of Some Recent Aduances in the Theory of Management of the
Firm, 24 J. INDUS. ECON. 30 (1965); Nordquist, The Breakup of the Maximization Prin-
ciple, 5 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus. 33 (1965); P. AscH, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTrrnusT
DILEMMA (1970). But see Enke, On Mazimizing Profits: A Distinction Between Cham-
berlain and Robinson, 41 AM. ECON. Rv. 566 (1951); Hitch & McKean, What Can Man-
agerial Economics Contribute to Economic Theory? 51 Am. ECON. Ray. 147 (1961).
119. For admirable surveys of the development of economic thought on the nature
of competition see Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 1957 J. OF
POL. ECON. 1; J.M. CLARK, CoMPaTMON As A DYNAMhc PRocEss, (1961); McNulty, A Note
on the History of Perfect Competition, 1967 J. oF POL. ECON. 365; and, by the same
author, Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, 1968 Q. J. of Econ. 639.
120. See, e.g., P.W.S. ANDREws, ON CopommoN m EcoNomic THEORY, (1964).
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its merits, ' the proponents of the theory have demonstrated
that it possesses significant power to explain and predict the ob-
servable conduct of real-world firms. Furthermore, until such
time as a theory is developed that is clearly a better predictor, or
that indubitably provides a better explanation of economic be-
havior, we must use the tools at hand. It makes little sense to
discard a theory which has demonstrated some merit in the ab-
sence of a demonstrably superior alternative.
Where courts are trying issues related to such nebulous phe-
nomena as foreclosed profits, opportunity costs, and cross elas-
ticities of demand, they should determine initially which aspects
of microeconomic theory are applicable to the case at bar and
should be retained, and which are so incompatible with the
needs of real cases as to warrant immediate rejection. It is clear
that the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick entertained serious
doubts regarding the "array of simplifying assumptions". This
article's analysis will reject those assumptions and replace them
with others of a more general nature; then inferences can be de-
rived regarding the measurement and apportionment of recover-
able damages as between the passer and the passee.
The first step is to relax the assumption that the market for
the passer's product is perfectly competitive. The conventional
definition of a perfectly competitive market is, "a market in
which the individual buyer or seller does not influence the price
by his purchases or sales. Alternately stated, the elasticity of
supply facing any buyer is infinite, and the elasticity of demand
facing any seller is infinite. '12 2
This characterikation of a perfectly competitive market im-
plies that a firm which does not sell its goods in such a market
121. The debate has focused on whether managers equate MR and MC either con-
sciously or subconsciously, whether managers have even heard of MR and MC and
whether overt recognition of these concepts is a prerequisite to achieve their equation,
and whether one should even be troubled about the whole affair. For a sampling of the
most pertinent considerations, see the following:. Oliver, Marginal Theory and Business
Behavior, 38 AM. ECON. REv. 275 (1945); Hague, Economic Theory and Business Behav-
ior, 26 REv. OF EcoN. STUmns 144 (1949); Early, Marginal Policies of "Excellently Man-
aged" Companies, 46 AM. ECON. REv. 44 (1956); Horowitz, The Advance of the Theory
of the Firm: One Step Forward, One Step Back, 7 Q. Ray. OF ECON. & Bus. 53 (1967).
122. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PicE 87 (1966). For further elucidation see Schaefer,
Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Anal-
ysis, 16 Wm. & MARY L. Rpv. 887, 887 n. 22. (1975).
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must face a demand curve which is downward sloping, or one
that is of less than infinite elasticity. The simplest, most obvious
consequence of this fact is that if the firm raises its price to its
customers, it will experience a reduction in unit sales. The line
indicated by D in Figure 1128 depicts such a demand curve.12'
This is the demand curve facing the direct purchaser or passer.
The passer's customers are the passees.
123. The horizontal line MC on the diagram represents the firm's marginal operat-
ing costs. It is defined as the addition to total costs which the firm incurs when produc-
ing one more unit of output during a particular time period. Since the MC curve is a
horizontal straight line, the firm's unit costs are independent of the level of output, and
average costs are equal to marginal cost.
The assumption that average costs are independent of the level of total output con-
forms reasonably well to actual production technology and factor pricing. This assump-
tion has been frequently exploited by economists as a means of simplifying analyses
without doing much violence to reality. See, e.g., Harberger, Monopoly and Resource
Allocation, 44 AM. EcoN. R v. 77 (1954). Consider also what Professor Dewey has to say
on the subject-
From his earliest training, the economist has had drummed into his con-
sciousness the image of the firm's average total cost. And it is U-shaped.. .In the
real world, multi-plant firms need not have U-shaped cost curves. Only in the very
shortest run does a firm expand output by making greater demands on its existing
production capacity. Rather, it expands output by increasing productive capacity
which usually means acquiring another plant; and there is no good a priori to
suppose average total cost will increase when the additional plant is acquired.
Since multiplant firms exist, economies of multiplant ownership must also exist.
D. Dewey, The New Learning: One Man's View in Industrial Concentration: THE New
LEARNING 5 (Goldschmid, Mann & Weston ed. 1974). See D. DEWEY, THE THEORY OF
IMPERFECT COMPITION 42-59 (1969). In support of Dewey's contention, see K. LANcAS-
TER, INTRODUCTION TO MICROECONOMICS 105-127 (1969). Moreover, a series of statistical
studies have found that even in the short run the marginal cost is constant, which neces-
sarily implies that average cost is constant until "capacity" is reached. See, e.g., J. JOHN-
STON, STATISTICAL CosT ANALYsis (1960); K. COHEN & R. CYERT, THEORY OF THE Fnm
101-07 (1965). In any event, the assumption of average cost constancy is not a biased
one. It is merely a simplification to facilitate analysis of passing-on conduct.
124. Figure 1 represents a less than perfectly comptetitive market.
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The horizontal line on the diagram denoted by MC repre-
sents the firm's marginal operating costs. It is defined as the ad-
dition to total costs which the firm incurs when producing one
more unit of output during a particular time period. In view of
the fact that the MC curve is a horizontal straight line, the
firm's unit costs are independent of the level of output and aver-
age costs equal marginal cost.
Because the downward sloping demand curve facing the
passer signifies that he is not selling his wares in a perfectly
competitive market, the passer can adjust his output to maxi-
mize his profits. The line MR represents the marginal revenue
curve associated with the demand curve. If the passer was a
profit maximizer, he could set his output at a level denoted by
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Q*. This is the output level at which the marginal cost of that
output is exactly equal to the marginal revenue it brings in when
it is sold. The equality occurs at point A. The demand curve
informs the passer that his customers will purchase every unit of
output Q* at a unit price of P*. The total profits generated by
this pricing policy are represented geometrically by the rectangle
ABP*C.125
A firm which is not an assiduous profit-maximizer might se-
lect some level of output other than Q*. It may be greater or
smaller than Q* but unlikely to differ very greatly from the opti-
mal level for any sustained period of time, absent some external
constraint. The actual output of a passer who does not maimize
profits will not exceed Q because to do so would entail actual
operating losses. Henceforth the profit maximization assumption
will be relaxed, and substituted for it will be the supposition
that prior to the inception of the price-fixing conspiracy the di-
rect purchaser's output was somewhere between 0 and Q, not
necessarily Q*.
Another "simplifying assumption" cited by the Supreme
Court is that the overcharge is imposed equally on all of the
passer's competitors. 12 Because this analysis attempts to reveal
the extent to which an individual direct purchaser will pass on
the overcharge to his customers, no resort is necessary to im-
plausible generalizations regarding uniformity of overcharge in-
cidence. An analysis which reveals the amount of the overcharge
passed on will, ipso facto, permit courts to compute the distribu-
tion of the overcharge as between passer and passee once the
amount of the overcharge passed on is revealed.
1. No passing-on
The next consideration is how a price-fixing conspiracy im-
poses an unlawful burden on direct purchasers in the first in-
stance. The specific object of inquiry will be the economic mani-
festation of that burden. Once having identified the primary
incidence of the burden, the mechanism by which it is shifted to
indirect purchasers one link removed in the distribution chain
125. The area of profit rectangle is simply the algebraic difference between the rec-
tangle representing total sales revenue (OP*CQ) and total costs (OBAQ*).
126. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 741.
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will be examined. The shifting theory can be iterated as many
times as there are links in the distribution chain whose firms
play dual roles of passers/passees. Of course, if a firm sells only
to ultimate consumers, those consumers must bear the residual
burden. This burden may be so slight, however, as to be of mini-
mal proportions. While determining the weight of that burden is
an empirical question unamenable to theoretical resolution, a
method of measuring it can be developed.
Initially, it must be recognized that a passer's output repre-
sents an input factor, one of several factors of production, to the
passee. A conspiratorially effected price increase, or even an in-
nocent price increase, in the conspirator's product is regarded by
the direct purchaser as an increase in the price of one of his
input factors he purchases. Obviously, if the direct purchaser is
to maintain the same level of production after the conspirator's
price increase takes effect, his total costs of doing business will
increase. Thus, the initial manifestation of the antitrust viola-
tion is observed as an increase in the direct purchaser's marginal
cost. Therefore, if the price of one input factor increases, the
percentage change in the firm's marginal cost is equal to the
product of the percentage change in the input factor's price and
the percentage of the total marginal cost represented by the par-
ticular input factor whose price has changed. 127 If, for example,
the price-fixing conspiracy imposes an unlawful overcharge of
20% on the price of the conspirator's product, the direct pur-
chaser will perceive that the price of this input factor has in-
creased by 20%. If that input factor represented 25% of margi-
nal operating costs prior to the price increase, the unlawful
overcharge will have the effect of raising the firm's marginal
costs by 5%.128
Expressing these'relationships in symbols facilitates analy-
sis of the incidence of price-fixing overcharges. Let f, represent
the unit price of factor f paid by a direct purchaser to his sup-
plier prior to the imposition of an unlawful overcharge. When
the supplier conspires with others to fix the price of their prod-
127. For a proof of this proposition see, e.g., G. BECKmR, EcONOIUC THRoRY 142-143
(1971).
128. This result is reached as follows: 20% x 25% - 5%. If measured by the Lerner
Index, infra note 137, this would be: L, = .20.
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uct the result is the new higher price 2. From the direct pur-
chaser's point of view the percentage increase in the price he
pays for this factor input is f = (2 -d/f 1. If the factor input's
share of marginal cost prior to the overcharge is symbolized by
Sf, 129 then the percentage increase in the direct purchaser's mar-
ginal cost function is calculated as r,=fS/. If the direct pur-
chaser's pre-conspiracy marginal cost function is as depicted in
Figure 1,110 then the consequences of the price-fixing conspiracy
will be to effect a parallel displacement of the MC curve by the
amount r as depicted in Figure 2.11
PRICE FIGURE 2
129. Technically, the share of the factor's cost in the marginal cost of the firm is
calculated as: Sf= (f,/MPf)/MC where P, and MC are the pre-conspiracy price of the
factor and the firm's marginal cost, respectively, and MPf is the marginal product of the
factor in question. See Becker, supra note 127.
130. Figure 1, supra at text accompanying note 124.
131. MC, represents the post-conspiracy marginal cost curve. Its relation to the
preconspiracy marginal cost curve, MC,, is given by MC.=(I+r)MC, where rc is as de-
fined above. The vertical distance between the two cost curves measures the amount by
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If the direct purchaser does not alter his own production or sales
policies in any way to accommodate the increase in his operating
costs, he bears the entire economic burden of the overcharge and
the issue of passing-on does not arise. The actual damages suf-
fered by such a passive direct purchaser can be easily calculated
as the profits which the conspirators transfer from the direct
purchaser to themselves through the unlawful overcharge.
One may determine the magnitude of such an unlawful ex-
action geometrically. If the pre-conspiracy price charged by the
direct purchaser to his customers is indicated by P, in Figure 2,
and this price and the associated output are unchanged subse-
quent to the conspiratorially effected increase in marginal costs,
the recoverable damages are represented by the difference be-
tween the direct purchaser's pre-conspiracy and post-conspiracy
profits. This profit transfer is given by the area of the shaded
rectangle in Figure 2. Its numerical magnitude is calculated as
(MC2-MC) Q = rxMC,.Q.
2. Active Passing-On
After the initial incidence of an unlawful overcharge has
been established the passing-on issue can be introduced into the
analysis. The issue arises when the assumption that the direct
purchaser's response to an increase in his costs is one of supine
resignation is abandoned. A shift in the direct purchaser's cost
curve from MC, to MC., as in Figure 2, will generally induce the
direct purchaser to increase the price to his customers, accompa-
nied by a concomitant decrease in the output he offers for
sale.13
2
which the direct purchaser's marginal cost has been increased by the unlawful over-
charge. This distance is easily seen to be AMC=MC, - MC, = (1+rd MC, - MC1 =
rMC,. This quantity, rjMC,, represents the initial incidence of the unlawful charge.
132. The geometrical configuration of cost curves, the demand curve, and prices and
outputs, are the same in Figure 3 as in Figure 2, except that the post-conspiracy price
charged by the direct purchaser has been raised from its pre-conspiracy level P, to its
new post-conspiracy level P.. Similarly, the conspiratorially effected shift in the direct
purchaser's cost curve has caused a reduction in his output from its pre-conspiracy vol-
ume Q, to its post-conspiracy volume Q,.
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2. Active passing-on
After the initial incidence of an unlawful overcharge has
been established the passing-on issue can be introduced into the
analysis. The issue arises when the assumption that the direct
purchaser's response to an increase in his costs is one of supine
resignation is abandoned. A shift in the direct purchaser's cost
curve from MC1 to MC., as in Figure 2, will generally induce the
direct purchaser to increase the price to his customers, accompa-
nied by a concomitant decrease in the output he offers for
sale.13 2
PRICE FIGURE 3
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132. The geometrical configuration of cost curves, the demand curve, and prices and
outputs, are the same in Figure 3 as in Figure 2, except that the post-conspiracy price
charged by the direct purchaser has been raised from its pre-conspiracy level P, to its
new post-conspiracy level P,. Similarly, the conspiratorially effected shift in the direct
purchaser's cost curve has caused a reduction in his output from its pre-conspiracy vol-
ume Q, to its post-conspiracy volume Q,.
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plicable when imputing the distributional burden of the over-
charge among as many links as there are in the distribution
chain.
If the methodology applied correctly assesses the extent to
which an overcharge is passed along to the first line of indirect
purchasers, or the primary indirect purchasers, then the extent
to which the overcharge is manifested as an increase in the cost
structure of the primary indirect purchasers will also have been
established. If significant, this increase in the cost to the pri-
mary indirect purchasers will induce them to alter their price
and output decisions in the same way as did the direct purchas-
ers when confronted with the initial incidence of the overcharge;
namely, the primary indirect purchaser will increase his price
and decrease his output in order to shift a portion of the over-
charge onto the group of secondary indirect purchasers. The ex-
tent to which the primary indirect purchasers are able to effect
this shift is revealed by applying the analytical methodology de-
veloped to assess the distributional incidence between direct
purchasers and their immediate customers, the primary indirect
purchasers. Thus, having developed a reliable method of assess-
ing distributional incidence between the first two links in the
distribution chain, that methodology can now be applied to as-
sess subsequent shifting among more remote links in the chain.
When all the links to the ultimate consumer have been ex-
hausted, both the aggregate magnitude of the damages as well as
its incidence among all firms in the chain of distribution will
have been computed.133
Figure 3 assesses the damages suffered by the direct pur-
chaser less those passed along to his own customers. Prior to the
imposition of the unlawful overcharge the direct purchaser's
profits are represented by the area of the rectangle ABCP. 1 4
Subsequent to the antitrust violation, the new cost structure
133. The nature of the market mechanisms confronting firms operating at various
links in the distribution chain may be such as to result in an ever dwindling portion of
the overcharge shifted between successive links. This is an empirical question, however.
The analysis in the text of this paper merely constitutes a method of computing the
portion of the overcharge which may be shifted. The actual amount to be shifted in
specific cases will depend on the magnitudes assumed by the variety of parameters which
characterizes particular markets.
134. Figure 3, supra at text accompanying note 132.
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confronting the direct purchaser induced him to raise his price
and decrease his output to P2 and Q2 respectively. His new level
of profits, hereinafter called post-violation profits, is represented
by the area of the rectangle DEFP2. 135
The measurable injury suffered by the direct purchaser is
computed as the profits he lost due to the changes in the reve-
nues and costs. The conspiratorially effected increase in costs
was the proximate cause of the direct purchaser's decision to
raise his price and lower his output. He did so only to mitigate
the diminution in his profits resulting from the cost increase.
The conclusion is that the lost profits constitute the recoverable
damages if the direct purchaser brings a section 1 claim against
the price-fixers. Likewise, the lost profits constitute the net bur-
den of the overcharge to the direct purchaser, because it is only
this portion of the burden which he was unable to pass on to his
own customers. When a direct purchaser responds to an increase
in his costs he accommodates his price/output configuration to
mitigate its harmful effects, and his recoverable damages are
computable as the difference between the area of rectangle
ABCPI and rectangle DEFP2 .136
Equation (1)
Damages = [rc(I-L,)- (Li-u + 1) r, R2
1+rp -+rp
In this formula for computing the damages suffered by a di-
rect purchaser the symbols have the following meanings:
rc = the percentage increase in the direct purchaser's marginal
cost brought about by the price-fixing conspiracy.
rp = the percentage by which the direct purchaser raises his
post-violation price above his pre-violation price.
E = the price elasticity of demand for the direct purchaser's
product, evaluated at the direct purchaser's post-violation price.
R2 = gross sales revenue of the direct purchaser at his post-vio-
lation price/output configuration.
L= = the Lerner Index of Monopoly Power evaluated at the pre-
135. This figure is hereinafter called post-violation profits.
136. Appendix I carries out the computation to arrive at an algebraic statement of
recoverable damages.
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violation price/cost combination.5 7
The damage assessment formula depicted in Equation (1)
137. A careful consideration of the definition of a competitive market reproduced
above, or simply a contemplation of the market mechanism characteristics of actual oli-
gopolies, suggests that the direct purchaser will be successful in passing on the unlawful
overcharge only to the extent that he is able to exercise monopoly power in the market in
which he sells his wares. The Lerner Index of Monopoly power is a measurement tool
which allows us to incorporate this important determinant of the shiftability of price-
fixing injuries. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly
Power, 1 Rav. oF EcON. STUDiS 157 (1934) [hereinafter cited as the Lerner Index],
Lerner proposed a measure of monopoly which recognizes that "the mark of the
absence of monopoly is the equality of price or average receipts to marginal cost." Id. at
161. Lerner suggested that monopoly be measured by the extent of divergence of price
from marginal cost. Specifically, the Lerner Index is defined as: L = (Price - Marginal
Cost) / Price. In perfect competition, market dynamics compel price to equal marginal
cost and the value of the L index is zero. The greater the ability of the firm to price
above marginal cost, the higher the value of the L index, and the greater the degree of
monopoly inferred. This proposition is frequently affirmed by writers on the subject,
sometimes embellishing it with allusions to ingress and egress from markets. Consider,
for example, the following recent pronouncement: "The essence of monopoly power is
the ability to prevent the expansion of capacity, (i.e. expansion by other firms mani-
fested as an increase in existing rivals' output or by entry of new rivals) when price
exceeds unit cost." DEusETz, HAOLD, Two SYsTEMs Or BELIE AnouT MONOPOLY IN IN-
DUSTRIAL CONCETRATmON: Ttm NEw LEaARNIo, 166 (Goldschmid, Mann & Weston eds.
1974). See also D. DEwEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAw, 70-96 (1966). Posner also
identifies the divergence between price and cost as a manifestation of monopoly power
"The monopolist will always charge a price higher than the competitive price, where the
"competitive price" is "equal" to the cost of making and selling the product in question."
R. PosNan, ANTITRusr LAw: AN EcoNoMic PEmPS'EcTnz 9 (1976). For treatment of the
conventional theory of monopoly pricing see IL POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS Or LAW 104-
113 (1973). For further discussion of the theoretical and operational characteristics of the
L rner Index see F.M. ScHamn, INDusTRiAL MARKEr STmucTUR AND ECONOMIC PaR-
FORMANCB 50 (1970). Examples of attempts to apply the index to individual industries
are provided by Dunlop, Prior Flexibility and the Degree of Monopoly 53 Q. J. oF ECON.
522-33 (1939); Tucker, The Degree of Monopoly, 54 Q. J. oF ECON. 167 (1940).
The Lerner Index is conceptually appropriate for a wide range of problems having to
do with the economic consequences of exercised monopoly power. By examining the
deviation from marginal cost pricing, it serves as an indicator of manifest, as opposed to
latent, market power, and measures the social cost or harm of monopolistic practices.
The application of the Lerner Index here will suppress the operational problems one
might encounter in attempting to supply numerical estimates for its ingredients. The
concern is to demonstrate that this theoretical tool, if properly used, will enable private
plaintiffs, as well as courts, to undertake reasonably reliable determinations of passing-
on issues.
The Lerner Index at the direct purchaser's pre-violation price is symbolized as L, or
L, = (P, - MC,)/P. Its magnitude represents the extent to which the direct purchaser
has actually exercised his monopoly power prior to the increase in his costs effected by
the price-fixing conspiracy. The larger this number is the more successful the direct pur-
chaser will be in passing on the unlawful overcharge to his own customers.
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can be illustrated by applying it to the situation where the direct
purchaser is a perfect competitor in the market in which he sells
his own product. In such a case the theory of competitive market
dynamics precludes any attempt by the direct purchaser to shift
the incidence of the unlawful overcharge to his own customers.
This is because in any given market period the demand curve
facing him is infinitely elastic, represented graphically as a hori-
zontal line. Further, he is unable to raise his price above the
competitive market level, rp = 0, and his ability to exercise mo-
nopoly power is therefore nil, L, = 0. Thus, in the perfectly
competitive case we see that the damages recoverable by direct
purchasers are computed as:
Equation (2)
Damages = rR.
Equation (2) states that if price-fixers sell directly to direct
purchasers who are themselves perfect competitors, then the en-
tire burden of the unlawful overcharge is borne by those direct
purchasers. This burden is measured as the percentage by which
the direct purchaser's marginal cost has increased, due to the
overcharge, multiplied by the gross sales revenue enjoyed by the
direct purchasers subsequent to any output adjustment made to
accommodate the cost increase.
In the antipodal case where the direct purchaser exercises
monopoly power in both pre-violation and post-violation scena-
rios, the application of the damages assessment formula is not as
simple because the numerical values of the constituent term can
only be ascertained empirically. We do not know if L, will be a
large positive number, or if E, will be a negative number which
is small in absolute value. The actual values of L1 and E. will
vary among cases; in any specific case the determination
perforces devolves to one of econometric estimation.5 8 Table 3
138. Scherer, supra note 137, 50, comments that "the chief drawback of the Lerner
Index" is that "it is difficult to derive marginal cost estimates from accounting data." Id.
If courts are willing to admit into evidence economists' estimates of such mysterious
ideas as cross-price elasticities, four firm concentration ratios, unrealized profits, fore-
closed market shares and Herfindahl indices, none of which are unambiguously identifi-
able, the courts should be at least as receptive to cost estimates, purportedly based on
identifiable and verifiable balance sheet and income statement entries. The task of esti-
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conveys an idea of the magnitude of the quantities involved.13 9 It
shows the percentage increase in the direct purchaser's price
which he will impose on his customers or his passees, if he is to
shift the entire burden of the overcharge onto them. Each of the
three subtables in Table 3 is predicated upon differing post-vio-
lation price elasticities for the direct purchaser's product so that
mating the magnitude of the Lerner Index may not be as difficult as is commonly
thought if there is good reason to believe that marginal cost, whatever its magnitude, is
invariant with respect to total output, namely a horizontal line. In that case we may
obtain a good estimate of the index by multiplying its numerator and denominator by
total unit sales. This will have the effect of allowing us to measure the index as the rate
of return on sales: L= (P-MC) (P-MC) Q PQ-MCTotalP (P Q
Sales Revenue; MC.Q = Total Costs; therefore PQ-MC.Q = Profits and the rate of re-
turn on sales is ROS - L = Profit/Sales. These two components, profits and sales reve-
nue, obviate the task of estimating marginal cost magnitude.
139.
Table 3
Table 3a Extreme Inelasticity F_1=-0.1
Lr 0 .1 .2 .3 .4
.0 .046 .041 .036 .032
•.10 .091 .082 .072 .042
.0 .182 .163 .144 .12515 36 2 . 08 .094
Table 3b Unitary Elasticity E,-.0
.) 0 L, .1 
.2 .3 
.4
.5 .045 .050 .049 .050
.10 .100 .100 .097 .095
.20 .200 .193 .188 .182
Table 3c Extreme Elasticity %='--10.0
.c•.05 .236 .222 .206 .190
•.10 .350 .327 .303 .278
•.15 .441 .412 .382 .350
.2 25 .489 .451 .413
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E2 assumes a different value in each subtable. The columns of
the subtables give an array of hypothetical values for the Lerner
Index, and the rows represent different hypothetical values for
the increase in the direct purchaser's marginal cost, rc. The ele-
ments in the cells of the tables represent the values which rp
must assume if the direct purchaser is to pass on all of the un-
lawful overcharge, conditional on the values of E., L1, and r.
Table 3a considers the case where the demand curve facing
the direct purchaser is extremely inelastic at the post-violation
price charged his customers.140 Table 3a implies that if the de-
mand for the passer's product is extremely inelastic, the passer
has the ability to shift the entire burden of the unlawful over-
charge onto his own direct customers by effecting a price in-
crease which is less, in percentage terms, than his own marginal
cost increased. For example, assume that the conspirators are
succesful in raising the price to the direct purchaser of one of his
input factors by 25%. Assume also that this input factor repre-
sents 40% of the direct purchaser's marginal costs. Then the
percentage by which the direct purchaser's marginal costs in-
creases can be depicted as: r, = (.25) (.40) = .10. If the direct
purchaser enjoyed a pre-violation profit margin of 20%, as mea-
sured by the Lerner Index L, .- .20, then an inelasticity of the
passee's demand curve informs the direct purchaser that his to-
tal profits will be unaffected by the price-fixing conspiracy if he
raises his own price by 8.2% thereby passing on the unlawful
overcharge. In an actual case a strict application of the Illinois
Brick rule would permit a direct purchaser to recover treble
"damages" for an injury he never suffered, and at the same time
the rule would bar the direct purchaser's customers from recov-
ering any damage although they suffered all the injury imposed
by the price-fixers. This anomaly subverts one of the chief objec-
tives of section 4 of the Clayton Act, that of compensation to
those harmed by illegal price fixing conspiracies.
141
Table 3b examines the situation where the demand for the
direct purchaser's product is of unitary elasticity. 42 If the direct
purchaser wishes to pass on all of the unlawful overcharge in
140. See Table 3a, supra note 139.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
142. See Table 3b, supra note 139.
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such a case, he must raise his price by approximately the same
percentage as his marginal costs have increased.
In Table 3c the demand for the direct purchaser's product is
extremely elastic. " s In this case if the direct purchaser wants to
maintain his profits in the face of an increase in his costs, the
price increase put into effect will be much larger than the per-
centage increase in his costs.
The three hypothetical cases treated by the subtables of Ta-
ble 3 illustrate the conditions which are conducive to finding
that passing-on has occurred. Even if the court finds that the
price increase by the direct purchaser is not large enough, given
the relevant elasticity and degree of monopoly power, to pass on
the entire burden of the unlawful overcharge, the actual dam-
ages suffered by the direct purchaser are given by the formula in
Equation (1).144 The portion of the burden which the direct pur-
chaser does pass on can also be ascertained easily. The direct
purchaser's increase in the price of his output, symbolized by rp,
constitutes a factor price increase to the first line indirect pur-
chaser, the direct purchaser's most proximate passee. Thus the
magnitude of rp is one component in determining how much the
passee's marginal cost has risen; the other component is the por-
tion of the marginal cost of, the passee which the factor in ques-
tion represents. 1" To compute the actual damages suffered by
the first line passee, numerical estimates for the ingredients of
143. See Table 3c, supra note 139.
144. See equation 1, supra text accompanying note 136.
145. The formula used to compute unshifted damages does not depend on the as-
sumption that the passer acts to maximize profits. The formula assumes only that, if the
passer is confronted with an increase in his marginal costs, he will try to offset some of
this cost increase by raising the price of his wares to his own customers, the passees. If,
in fact, the passer is a classical profit maximizer, economic analysis allows derivation a
much more specific measure of the extent to which he will pass on the unlawful over-
charge. In the case of a profit maximizer who faces a linear demand function and an
increase in his constant marginal cost curve, the amount by which he raises his price is
half the amount of the cost increase which he experiences. See Appendix 2, infra, for a
mathematical proof of this proposition. Thus, in the case where the passer does system-
atically adjust his price/output combinations as to maximize profits we have the relation
I (mcA ) . This relationship enables the trier of fact to determine therp=2 re P, •
portion of the increase in the direct purchaser's costs which are passed on to the first line
of indirect purchasers; and how much of the increase in the latters' cost are thereafter
passed on their customers and so on ad infinitum.
19821
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Equation (1) are needed only for the passee's Lerner Index, the
elasticity of the demand curve for the passee's output, and the
percentage by which the first line passee raises his price when
passing on the burden to those further down the distribution
chain.1 48
To summarize, the formula expressed in Equation (1) allows
courts and enforcement agencies to compute reasonably reliable
estimates of the amount of injury imposed on each link in a dis-
tribution chain by a price-fixing conspiracy. The method of com-
putation does not rely for its validity upon any of the "simplify-
ing assumptions" which the Supreme Court noted in Illinois
Brick.
For the most part, the only ingredients of Equation (1) re-
quired to render it operational are directly observable economic
quanta, such as price and cost changes. The only ingredient
which is not directly observable is the elasticity measure. De-
spite some misgivings expressed by the Court in Illinois Brick
regarding the usefulness of elasticity estimates,147 the ever grow-
ing number of cases they have been admitted into evidence sig-
nifies their probative value and attests to the willingness of
courts to the techniques and insights of modern econometrics.148
146. See supra note 139.
147. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 741-42. See supra text accompanying
note 57.
148. In their discussion of the use of elasticity estimates in antitrust litigation,
Professors Posner and Landes write:
Although econometric techniques are available that can, in principle, be used
to estimate point elasticities, there are many practical difficulties with such esti-
mations. We are fearful of the increase in costs, time and uncertainty involved in
antitrust enforcement if the passing-on issue is injected into suits by direct or
indirect purchasers.
Landes & Posner supra note 1, at 619. The "fearfulness" with which Landes and Posner
regard the introduction of elasticity measures into antitrust litigation, motivates them to
cite with disapproval the paper by Elmer Schaefer who has trenchantly advocated the
use of elasticity concepts to analyze passing-on questions. Id. See Schaefer, Passing-On
Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 883 (1975). In their critique of the Schaefer article Landes and Posner
write "Yet he [Schaefer] does not cite, nor do we know of, a single case in which an
antitrust court has attempted to estimate an elasticity of demand or supply." Landes &
Posner, supra note 1, at 619 n. 39. This observation, I would suggest, is beside the point.
As a practical matter the antitrust courts make findings of fact based on the evidence
adduced at trial through the testimony of witnesses, expert and otherwise. The courts
are called upon to "estimate" a demand elasticity only insofar as they are required to
weigh the probative value of the experts' own estimates. To suggest, as Landes and Pos-
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V. Prospective Consequences of the Rule Proscribing
Offensive Passing-On
This section of the article examines a potential consequence
of the Illinois Brick rule which does not seem to have come to
the attention either of its supporters or its detractors: the possi-
bility that a denial of a remedy to all indirect purchasers may be
regarded by potential violators as an opportunity to effect an
invulnerable price-fixing conspiracy by arranging for transfer
payments to innocent direct purchasers, thereby averting liabil-
ity under section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 49
A. Two-Dimensional Conspiracy
Initially the proposition that a two-dimensional price-fixing
conspiracy may be effected with impunity should be discarded.
Consider the legal characterization of the original group of price-
fixers, representing link N, somewhere in the distribution chain.
This group constitutes a horizontal conspiracy. If that group
persuades their direct purchasers, at the successive link N+1 in
the distribution chain, to actively participate as willing co-con-
spirators fixing prices, the conspiracy will result in victimization
of more remote links in the chain. This combination constitutes
a hybrid horizontal/vertical conspiracy; it becomes a two-dimen-
sional price-fixing conspiracy. This sort of anticompetitive be-
havior violates section 1 of the Sherman Act, and nothing in Illi-
nois Brick affords protection to the conspirators against a
challenge by first level indirect purchasers. These first-level indi-
rect purchasers are those at link N+2, namely those customers
of the conspirators at line N+1 in the distribution chain. Sim-
ply stated, the allegation of a two-dimensional conspiracy has
the effect of transmuting the plaintiff's status from that of indi-
rect purchaser to that of direct purchaser, thereby removing him
from the ambit of Illinois Brick. 50 The following discussion con-
ner seem to, that courts are not competent to produce their own estimates of elasticity is
disingenuous. In actual fact an antitrust court will seldom, if ever, be called upon to
estimate an elasticity. Their "estimate" will consist of the ratification of an expert's bona
fide estimate.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
150. Several cases decided after Illinois Brick establish that the two-dimensional
conspiracy of the kind described above is not immune to attack by "indirect purchasers"
1982]
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cerns the situation where the first-line direct purchasers, those
at link N+1, are innocent of any overt or tacit conspiratorial
conduct or intent. In this instance, the Illinois Brick holding
may create opportunities for potential violators to design a
price-fixing mechanism which is insulated against attack by
those who are its only victims.
B. Insulated Conspiracies
A few elementary propositions can be set out regarding the
conditions necessary for a conspiracy to exist. A conspiracy con-
sists of a collusion of firms and, in the case of a horizontal con-
spiracy, that collusion is an alliance of competing firms. Collu-
sion will tend to occur in a horizontal conspiracy whenever it is
more profitable to all of the participants than their feasible al-
ternatives. For this to be true, not only must the joint profit
maxiTmnum exceed the combined competitive return, but also
none of the parties to the collusion must be able to obtain a
higher return by means of some feasible strategy, assuming that
all the others adhere to the collusive agreement. In other words,
for a price-fixing conspiracy to be successfully effectuated, each
conspirator must regard the expected net benefits to himself of
violating the collusive agreement to be exceeded by the expected
net benefits to himself of observing that agreement.
In a typical price-fixing conspiracy the participating firms
retain their separate identities and separate control over their
policies subject to the terms of the collusive agreement. The pos-
sibility of making side payments means that co-conspirators can
freely transfer sums of money among themselves or to non-par-
under section 1. 15 U.S.C. § 15. See, e.g., Gas-A-Tron-of Arizona v. American Oil Co.,
1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,789 (D. Ariz. 1977). In the Gas-A-Tron case the allegation
of a conspiracy between refiner and wholesaler to fix resale prices avoided dismissal by
the court. The court ruled that no pass-on of overcharges was involved and that Illinois
Brick was inapplicable where refiners were alleged to have conspired with plaintiffs' sup-
pliers to fix prices at which the plaintiffs purchased gasoline. See also Florida Power
Corp. v. Granlund, 78 F.R.D. 441 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (an allegation of a conspiracy between
a utility and its oil suppliers to fix the price of supplied raw material is sufficient to allow
a direct purchaser from the utility to intervene in an action by the utility against oil
suppliers); In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,069 (D. Ariz. 1978) (motion for summary judgment denied where there is an issue of
fact as to whether any defendant combined or conspired with entities from which plain-
tiffs purchased).
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ticipating parties. These transfers may be independent of sales
or the outputs of the firms. The transfers may be used to induce
conduct of non-conspirators to promote the interests of the
members of the conspiracy. This last proposition suggests the
means by which a group of price-fixers may attempt to immu-
nize themselves against liability under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.151
There is a certain market structure which is conducive to a
two-dimensional price-fixing conspiracy. The market structure
must be such as to permit collusion between links. Collusion
among sellers seems more likely if the buyers are numerous and
relatively small. Suppose, on the contrary, there were a few large
buyers with a fairly stable demand. These may be assigned to
particular members of the price-fixing conspiracy who can
thereby share the market. The very paucity in number and rela-
tively large size of the buyers, however, work against a monopoly
return altogether. One of the buyers can threaten to withdraw
his patronage from a seller, thus threatening the bulk of seller's
business, and compelling the seller to betray the conspiracy.
With few relatively large buyers the situation resembles bilateral
monopoly, and it would be surprising to find the sellers ob-
taining a monopoly return at the buyers' expense. It is more
likely to find a combination of buyers and sellers to exploit their
common interest at the expense of third parties, the indirect
purchasers. A two-dimensional conspiracy has been shown to be
vulnerable to attack by the indirect purchasers. But if the sellers
form a purely horizontal price-fixing combination instead of
recruiting their direct purchasers into a conspiracy, they can re-
transfer to their direct purchasers a sufficiently large portion of
the unlawful exaction to compensate those direct purchasers for
the diminution in their profits.
The specific mechanism by which these transfers are ef-
fected can be more particularly described. In Stage I, sellers at
level N in the distribution chain form themselves into a horizon-
tal price-fixing conspiracy and proceed to raise the price to their
direct purchaser customers at link N+1. Those direct purchaser
customers react in Stage 2 to the increase in the price of one of
their factor inputs by raising the price to their customers at link
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
1982]
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N+2 in the manner illustrated by Figure 3.162 At this point the
first line direct purchaser customers have standing and incentive
to bring a section I action against the conspirators. In Stage 3,
however, the price-fixers transfer a lump sum payment to their
direct purchaser customers. The amount of the lump sum pay-
ment equals the profits lost by the direct purchasers as a conse-
quence of their price/output adaptation to the cost increase. The
numerical value of these lump sum transfers is expressed by
Equation (1).253 Subsequent to the transfer, the firms at link
N+1 find themselves in the same profit position as that prior to
the increase in their costs. The first line indirect purchasers,
namely those at link N+2, however, are confronted with an in-
crease in the price of one of their factor inputs, but without a
legal recourse because those from whom they purchased their
goods are not co-conspirators.
The quicksilver quality of this economic analysis may be
dispelled by recognizing that the gross injury inflicted on the
first-line purchasers is transferred to the conspirators; the same
gross injury is mitigated by the direct purchasers through a price
increase imposed on their customers. The result is that the lump
sum payment, necessary to be retransfered by the horizontal
conspiracy to make the direct purchasers whole, is less than the
amount originally exacted from those purchasers. The difference
between the two constitutes the net gain to the conspiracy and it
is ultimately manifested as injury to the chain of indirect pur-
chasers. This hypothetical transfer/retransfer device is most
likely to occur in those markets where the economic characteris-
tics of firms at adjacent links conform to the bilateral monopoly
conditions described previously.
This sort of collusive arrangement may be very appealing to
participants in a horizontal conspiracy because of two special
features: first, the transfer/retransfer device by which the price-
fixers first exact income from and subsequently reimburse them
diminishes the incentives for those direct customers to bring an
action under section 1; second, the parties who bear the burden
of the price-fixing conspiracy cannot vindicate their rights be-
cause Illinois Brick denies them a forum.
152. Figure 3, supra text accompanying note 132.
153. Equation (1), supra text accompanying note 136.
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If the direct purchasers are not merely passive instruments
through which the price-fixers exercise their monopoly power, a
remedy will be available to the indirect purchasers. Virtually all
courts agree that merely passing on a price increase is not, alone,
sufficient to brand the passers as co-conspirators with their
price-fixing suppliers;154 Illinois Brick will only permit first-line
indirect purchasers to recover changes based on a two-dimen-
sional conspiracy theory if the plaintiffs can allege and prove an
actual conspiracy between the price-fixers and the passers. It re-
mains to be seen whether courts will hold the transfer/retransfer
device to constitute conduct sufficient to find that the passers/
transferees are liable under section 1 as co-conspirators with
their suppliers. Illinois Brick does not suggest such a theory of
liability. If the direct purchaser responds to an increase in his
costs merely by raising his own price, 55 and if he neither solicits
154. See, e.g., Pony Creek Cattle Co. v. A. & P., (In re Beef Industry Antitrust
Litigation) 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980) (act of pass-
ing-on insufficient to brand packers co-conspirators with food retailers; Illinois Brick
does not recognize an exception for a vertical conspiracy where co-conspirator middle-
men are not named as defendants); Mid-West Paper Product Co. v. The Continental
Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979) (claims by indirect purchasing supermarkets
against manufacturers of consumer bags for price fixing are barred where no possibility
that pre-existing fixed quantity cost-plus contracts could be shown at each intermediate
level of distribution); Parkview Markets, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
62,373 (S.D. Ohio 1978)) ("(t]he holding of Illinois Brick not limited to the facts of the
case, an indirect purchaser bringing an action for a passed-on overcharge; damage action
by grocery wholesaler/cooperative was dismissed where only indirect injury in the form
of lost profits and members could be caused by claimed monopolization at retail level);
Fontana Aviation, Inc., v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 460 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1978) Illinois
Brick held to bar claim of attempted monopolization of market for installing avionics in
manufacturer's aircraft by manufacturer's pricing to plaintiff's supplier who passed on
inflated prices to plaintiff; economic realities of pass-on would be same even if distribu-
tor conspired with manufacturer and Illinois Brick would preclude recovery of damages
from manufacturer; Dart Drug Co. v. Coming Glass Works, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,126 (D. Md. 1979) (drug store chain claimed that manufacturer's monopolization and
group boycott forced it to buy from wholesalers at prices higher than those available to
some of chain's direct-buying competitors. It was not premised on any overcharge that
had been passed on and Illinois Brick was inapplicable but not where prices alleged to
have been set above competitive market level).
155. This approach is generally referred to as cost-plus pricing as Pappas and Brig-
ham state:
Surveys of actual business pricing indicate that cost-plus pricing, or full-cost pric-
ing as it is sometimes called, is by far the most prevalent pricing method em-
ployed by business firms. There are many varieties of cost-plus pricing, but a typi-
cal one involves estimating the average variable cost of producing and marketing a
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nor enters into an agreement with his suppliers respecting a
lump sum payment, then it would seem that the element of in-
tent necessary to find liability is lacking. This behavior reflects
ordinary and reasonable non-collusive business policies, and
courts should hesitate before declaring it unlawful.
The firm's ability to shift to its customers an increase in its
own costs depends, in part, on the elasticity of the demand
curve facing it. In general, the further one moves from the retail
level towards the level of the original producer, the more inelas-
tic the demand will be. This is a consequence of the fact that
marketing margins tend to be inflexible. The implication of the
change in demand elasticities as one moves down the distribu-
tion chain towards the ultimate consumer is that the transfer/
retransfer mechanism we have examined will be increasingly
more difficult to implement. That is to say, to the extent that a
firm possesses monopolistic power, the demand for its product
will be inelastic and the ability of that firm to pass on cost in-
creases will be greater. As one moves down the distribution
chain the demand elasticities faced by firms at successive links
tend to increase thereby diminishing the ability of those firms to
pass on cost increases. Thus, the incentives for rival firms to or-
ganize themselves into a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy are
greatest when they perceive that their proximate victims, the di-
rect purchasers, are capable of exercising monopoly power. The
direct purchasers' market power is manifested as an inelastic de-
mand curve in the market in which the indirect purchasers are
the buyers. This reasoning suggests that price-fixing conspiracies
are most likely to occur as firms move further away from the
ultimate consumer.156 A proliferation of monopolies is rendered
particular product, adding a charge for overhead, and then adding a percentage
markup, or margin, for profits.
J. PAPPAS & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL ECONoMIcs 406 (1979). Moreover, the policy of
cost-plus pricing has received judicial recognition in the Illinois Brick case: "Firms in
many sectors of the economy rely to an extent on cost-based rules of thumb in setting
prices." Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 744.
156. Commentators have observed that a price-fixing agreement is more likely for a
product that is subject to an inelastic demand because greater profits can be exacted
under such market conditions. See Erickson, Economics of Price Fixing, 2 ANrrmusr L.
& ECON. Rav. 83 (1969); Kuhlman, Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2
ANTTrrusT L. & ECON. RzV. 69 (1969); Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A
Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. Rsv. 1562, 1569-75, 1603-04 (1969); Posner, A Program
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feasible by the holding of Illinois Brick because it enables a
group of price-fixers to design a transfer/retransfer scheme
which removes from the only parties who have standing to sue
their incentive to do so. 1 57
To sum up, price-fixing violations seem especially likely to
occur when a direct purchaser can pass the unlawful overcharge
on to his customers. The elasticities of demand toward the con-
sumer-end of the distribution chain are likely to be greater and
the firms whose markets are at that end will perceive themselves
unable to pass on a significant part of the overcharge. Thus, at
for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. Rav. 500, 515 n. 47 (1971). For a general discus-
sion of characteristics which make an industry ripe for successful price-fixing, see G.
STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 36-63 (1968).
157. The absence of an incentive for direct purchasers to sue price-fixers can be
traced to two aspects of the transfer/retransfer scheme. The first aspect, which has been
discussed in the text, is that the scheme has the effect of permitting the direct purchaser
to enjoy an unabated volume of profits notwithstanding the fact that his output has been
contracted. Thus, the direct purchaser perceives no injury to himself inflicted by the
price-fixers. Secondly, and less obvious, is the fact that the output reduction which the
direct purchaser undertakes has the consequence of freeing pecuniary or other resources
which would otherwise have been allocated to the production of output. These newly
freed resources can be reallocated into investment opportunities which offer rates of re-
turn commensurate with their riskiness. The earnings which the newly freed resources
bring into the firm are added to the profits which the firm already enjoys. The result is
that the transfer/retranafer scheme enables the direct purchasers to enjoy greater earn-
ings than they would have but for the price-fixing conspiracy. Direct purchasers in such
an enviable position will be understandably reluctant to kill the goose that lays the
golden eggs by suing the price-fixers.
Moreover, the higher price which the direct purchaser pays to the price-fixing seller
may confer additional benefits if the direct purchaser is a firm which is subject to regula-
tory action governing its permitted rate-of-return to capital. For example, the electrical
equipment price-fixing conspiracies may have benefitted electrical utilities in jurisdic-
tions where regulatory agencies use reproduction-cost valuation to assess the rate base.
In those jurisdictions, payment of a higher price for a new piece of equipment may lead
to an increased valuation for a utility's entire stock of previously purchased equipment.
Energy, Regulated'Utilities and Equipment Manufacturer's Conspiracies in the Elec-
trical Power Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMr. So. 322-29 (1973); Westfield, Regula-
tion and Conspiracy, 55 AM. ECON. Rav. 424 (1965). The dissenting opinion of Justice
Brennan in the Illinois Brick case reaches the same conclusion:
Today's decision flouts Congress' purpose and severely undermines the effec-
tiveness of the private treble-damages action as an instrument of antitrust en-
forcement ... the Court's decision frustrates both the compensation and deter-
rence objectives of the treble-damages action. Injured consumers are precluded
from recovering damages from manufacturers, and direct purchasers who act as
middlemen have little incentive to sue suppliers so long as they may pass on the
bulk of the illegal overcharges to the ultimate consumers.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the consumer end of the distribution chain, the incentive to dis-
cover and prosecute price-fixing conspiracies is the greatest. If
these firms are denied the opportunity to litigate their claims
merely because the Illinois Brick decision relegates them to the
status of indirect purchasers, that denial will incapacitate the
very parties who are likely to be the most vigorous private en-
forcers of the antitrust laws. It does not seem to me to be an
exaggeration to characterize such a result as a perversion of the
spirit of antitrust legislation.
VI. Procedural Considerations
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick identified the prospect
of multiple liability as one reason for proscribing the use of of-
fensive passing-on in private treble damage claims. 5 8 It would
be unfair to the defendant, the Court argued, to allow offensive
passing-on to be used against him, while at the same time deny-
ing him the use of the passing-on theory as a defense in light of
the Hanover Shoe decision.15 9
The holdings of Hanover Shoe, and its mirror image, Illi-
nois Brick, have breathed new life into Judge Cardozo's famous
dictum that the reconstruction of the citadel of privity is pro-
ceeding apace in antitrust law.160 Although the language of Han-
over Shoe and Illinois Brick does not expressly invoke the doc-
trine of privity, the denial to the parties of the use of defensive
and offensive passing-on theories has the procedural effect of de-
nying a forum to all persons except those who can prove they
deal directly with each other, thus effectively requiring privity.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Illinois Brick
identified a variety of procedural devices available to defendants
158. Id. at 738.
159. The Court stated:
Allowing offensive but not defensive use of pass-on would create a serious risk of
multiple liablity for defendants .... A one-sided application of Hanover Shoe
substantially increases the possibility of inconsistent adjudications - and therefore
of unwarranted multiple liability for the defendant - by presuming that one plain-
tiff (the direct purchaser) is entitled to full recovery while preventing the defen-
dant from using that presumption against the other plaintiff ... we are unwilling
to "open the door to duplicative recoveries" under Section 4.
Id. at 730-31 (citation omitted).
160. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Viven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445
(1931).
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and to the courts as a means of averting multiple liability.""
These include intra-district 162 and inter-district transfer113 and
consolidation of cases, statutory interpleader,1 " the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel. Moreover, it has been ob-
served that the relatively short statute of limitations period of
four years for treble damage antitrust suits also protects defen-
dants to some extent.16 5 Additional protection is afforded defen-
dants by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing inter-
vention 66 and interpleader,1 67 and compulsory joinder of
parties,166 and by the possibility of placing all or part of the
damages awarded to a direct purchaser in an interest bearing
escrow account for a definite period of time to satisfy later judg-
ments in favor of remote purchasers.16'
161. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 761-64.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (1976).
163. Id. § 1407.
164. Id. § 1335. The majority opinion in Illinois Brick disparages the utility of stat-
utory interpleader citing the bond requirement-
[A] condition precedent for invoking statutory interpleader is the posting of a
bond for the amount in dispute ... and a defendant may be unwilling to put up a
bond for the huge amounts normally claimed in multiple party treble damage
suits.
llinois Brick Co. v. llinois 431 U.S. 720, 738 n. 20 (citation omitted).
This obstacle can be averted by the courts if, in the exercise of their discretion, they
set the required bond at a relatively low level See Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on
the Offensive Use of the Passing-On Doctrine, 46 S. CA. L. REv. 98, 116 (1972); Com-
ment, The Passing-On Defense in Treble Damage Antitrust Suits 1969 U. ILL. L. F. 377,
387.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 15b. For a discussion of problems arising under this statute see
Wheeler and Jones, The Statute of Limitations for Antitrust Damage Actions: Four
Years or Forty?, 41 U. CHL L. Rzv. 72 (1973).
166. FED. . CV. P. 24.
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 22. It has been observed that interpleader under Rule 22 may
be unavailable to an antitrust defendant because of the unlikelihood of complete diver-
sity of citizenship in antitrust cases. See McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the
Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 177, 197 N. 65 (1971). The issue of apportionment of treble damages, how-
ever, would provide "federal question" jurisdiction, thereby permitting Rule 22 inter-
pleader even if the diversity requirement is not satisfied. See 3 J. MoolR, W. TAGGAtr &
J. WIcKE, MooRE's FFDmtAL PRAcncrC 22.04(2) (2d ed. 1974).
168. FaD. R. Civ. P. 19.
169. The Court in Hanover Shoe, while expressing no opinion as to whether passing-
on had occurred, allowed for the use of an interest bearing escrow account until the
statute of limitations becomes a bar to other possible claims; this fund would be accessi-
ble to plaintiffs who sue within the statutory period and establish damages. Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United States Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. at 488-89, 492-94. Cf. S.E.C. v.
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A thorough discussion of the efficacy of these procedural
mechanisms is well beyond the scope of this article. Those re-
cited have been identified by commentators and the courts as
procedures which may be invoked to preclude a finding of multi-
ple liability. These mechanisms may be imperfect and subject to
unforeseen obstacles in application, yet their availability implies
that the prospect of multiple liability is not an inductable conse-
quence of the doctrine of offensive passing-on. A more funda-
mental question is whether a finding of multiple liability consti-
tutes such an injustice as to warrant an absolute prophylactic
measure such as the rule proscribing offensive passing-on.
Consideration of this question starts from the proposition,
discussed in Section IV, that the deterrent objective of civil anti-
trust actions is achieved only to the extent that potential viola-
tors have reason to expect that their contemplated violations
will be unprofitable. This proposition dovetails very neatly with
Justice Brennan's observation that "from the deterrence stand-
point, it is irrelevant to whom damages are paid, so long as
someone redresses the violation. '170 If potential violators per-
ceive a significant likelihood of multiple liability, and if Justice
Brennan is correct in his supposition that the potential violators
are indifferent to the identity of judgment creditors, the incon-
trovertible conclusion is that a prospect of multiple liability aug-
ments the deterrent efficacy of the antitrust laws. This is be-
cause the prospect of multiple liability constitutes more of a
threat to potential violators than they would perceive in its ab-
sence. I tried to show in Section IV that however large the threat
of multiple liability may be, it can never be too large; if it is
large enough to succeed, it is never realized. From a pure deter-
rence standpoint, then, multiple liability ought to be encouraged
by the construction of the antitrust laws.
Regarding the more difficult problem of compensatory fair-
ness, the prospect of multiple liability entails the balancing of
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (corporate insider who traded with
access to inside information was required to pay profits into a fund; undistributed funds
at the end of five years became the property of the corporation, although it was not
damaged by the violation). The availability of such a technique in an antitrustoaction
was suggested in Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co., 248 F. Supp. 169, 177 (W.D.
Mo. 1965).
170. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 760.
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equities between an adjudicated antitrust violator and innocent
victims. The majority opinion in Illinois Brick undertook this
balancing task with a suprising degree of casualness, relegating
the analysis to a terse footnote:
[P]roponents of the use of the offensive passing-on doctrine ulti-
mately fall back on the argument that it is better for the defen-
dant to pay sixfold or more damages than for an injured party to
go uncompensated. ("a little slopover on the shoulders of the
wrongdoers .... is acceptable"). We do not find this risk
acceptable.171
The Court gives no reason for its "finding" that the risk of
multiple liability is unacceptable. Nor does the Court acknowl-
edge that some sort of equity calculus should be applied in order
to determine the parameters of an "acceptable" risk of multiple
liability. Instead, the Court simply imposes a Draconian pro-
scription which deems any risk of multiple liability, however
small, to be unacceptable. It is odd, at the very least that the
Court should be so solicitous of the pecuniary welfare of adjudi-
cated antitrust violators.
The main point associated with the compensatory fairness
of multiple liability can be simply stated: is it fair that an adju-
dicated wrongdoer should be compelled to pay treble damages
not only to those persons he has injured, the remote purchasers,
but also to those persons who sustained little or no injury, the
direct purchasers? It has been pointed out that the latter consti-
tutes a windfall to the direct purchaser plaintiff.171 It clearly vio-
lates the spirit of section 4 for the courts to hold that multiple
liability is intolerable solely because it may result in a windfall
to some plaintiffs. Theoretically, two-thirds of every private an-
titrust damages award, the punitive portion of the judgment
mandated by section 4, constitutes a windfall to the judgment
creditor.1 78 From this perspective the issue is transmuted from
171. Id. at 731 n.11. (citations omitted).
172. It would be "paradoxical to deny recovery to the ultimate consumer while per-
mitting the middleman a windfall recovery." P. AREmA, AwrrmUST ANALYSis: Pnonimus,
TEXT, CASEs 75 (2d ed. 1974). This passage was quoted with approval by Justice Bren-
nan. illinois Brick Co. v. illinois, 431 U.S. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. The characterization of two-thirds of the damages constituting a windfall must
be qualified; a portion of that two-thirds "punitive" award goes to reimburse the plaintiff
for real injuries he sustained but which are themselves not recoverable as compensatory
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one of whether to allow a windfall to one, to how much windfall
is to be deemed "too much." Congress has already addressed
this issue insofar as it has legislated its approval of a windfall
representing twice the actual damages sustained.
In addressing the equities from the defendant's perspective,
one relevant question which must be considered is how much
protection the law should confer on an adjudicated antitrust vio-
lator. First, it is arguable that requiring a defendant to chance
multiple liability is more consistent with the Congressional pur-
pose behind antitrust laws than is denying standing to injured
parties.17'4 Second, as a practical matter the burden on the judg-
ment debtor of a treble damage award is frequently less than
what might be supposed. At least one study has concluded that
antitrust violators often profit from their wrongdoing despite in-
curring treble damage liability.175  Finally, it should be
remembered that the prospect of multiple liability is always un-
certain; even if the use of offensive passing-on is permitted, the
burden of establishing liability remains with the plaintiff
whether he is a direct or indirect purchaser. This article argues
that the risk of multiple liability to defendants should not out-
weigh the rights of genuinely injured persons to seek redress. In
the words of one court: "[c]utting off the right of such a substan-
"damages." These might include such injuries as: foregone interest, earnings, and other
opportunity costs of funds; diversion of managerial skill from the running of the business
to the management of the litigation; and searching for and establishing business relations
with new new suppliers who are not members of the price-fixing conspiracy. It seems
fairly obvious, however, that these sorts of injuries are not likely to be of such magnitude
as to reduce the windfall element of the treble-damage award to zero.
174. The majority opinion in Illinois Brick purports to divine Congressional intent
by considering the legislative history of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976). The Court's analysis of intent, carried out in another
tersely worded footnote, concludes simply "we think the construction of section 4 (of the
Clayton Act)... cannot be applied for the exclusive benefit of plaintiffs. Should Con-
gress disagree with this result, it may, of course, amend the section to change it" Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 733 n. 14. In effect the Court seems to be saying that
notwithstanding "the pro-enforcement thrust of Hanover Shoe" the Court will construe
section 4 as it pleases, and if Congress doesn't like the result the burden is on them to do
something about it. At the very least this approach seems to be an inverted mode of
statutory construction. In fact, there is little doubt that the Congress is indeed mightily
displeased with the Court's imputation of intent. See Comment, Mangano and Ulti-
mate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 394,
411 (1972).
175. See Erickson, supra note 76.
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tial number of potentially injured persons merely because such a
'possibility' of multiple liability exists is far too drastic a mea-
sure to take." 176
VII. Conclusion
The Illinois Brick Court when proscribing the use of offen-
sive passing-on, explicitly endorsed the concern expressed in
Hanover Shoe:
The principal basis for the decision in Hanover Shoe was the
Court's perception of the uncertainties and difficulties in analyz-
ing price and output decisions "in the real economic world rather
than an economist's hypotehtical model," and of the costs to the
judicial system and the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws
of attempting to reconstruct those decisions in the courtroom. 177
Section IV of this article addressed this concern. That sec-
tion analyzed both the deterrent and compensatory conse-
quences of the Illinois Brick decision, relying upon such as-
sumptions as imputations of rationality to potential violators
and their potential victims, and the tendency of firms when con-
fronted with a cost increase to pass on that increase to their cus-
tomers in the form of higher prices. The analysis of Section IV
does not dispel all of the uncertainty connected with the trial of
indirect purchaser treble damage claims, considering the meth-
odological difficulties associated with the estimation of demand
curves and price elasticities. The limited objective of that Sec-
tion has been to produce a reasonably reliable formula which the
courts can apply to determine the approximate magnitude of the
harm inflicted by a price-fixing conspiracy on firms at successive
links in a distribution chain. Although the formula is not as
terse as might be desired, nor are all its ingredients amenable to
a straightforward computation, it has the virtue of being inde-
pendent of the implausible premises which the Court has
deemed objectionable.
This article's analyses, including the derivations of formu-
lae, have incorporated only those propositions of microeconomic
theory which are general enough to be unobjectionable to the
176. Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. IlL 1973).
177. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 732. (citations omitted).
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mainstream of the economics profession. The justification for in,
jecting economic theory into an analysis of antitrust policy has
been cogently expressed by Professor Dewey
The important issues in the control of monopoly are "economic"
in the sense that judges and administrators are compelled to
make decisions in the light of what they think the business world
is "really" like, and it is the task of economists through research
and reflection to provide them with an increasingly accurate
picture. 7
Although Professor Dewey's observation speaks of the "control
of monopoly," his admonitions apply equally to price-fixing be-
havior, which, economically speaking, is simply a particular
manifestation of monopoly power. What price-fixing really
amounts to is that a group of competitors agree to adopt a uni-
form pricing policy which, has exactly the same consequences to
their customers as if those sellers had merged into a single
monopoly. 7 9
The language of the Illinois Brick opinion reproduced above
seems to imply that economists have not done much to accom-
plish the task which Dewey sets for them: to provide an increas-
ingly accurate picture of what the business world is really like.
This article has attempted to add color and dimension to such a
picture through the use of an "economist's hypothetical model,"
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's apparent distaste for such
devices. The ultimate justification for bringing theory to bear on
real policy problems is the same in economics as it is in any of
the physical sciences: The practical implications of naked
"facts" are incomprehensible without a theory, no matter how
imperfect it may be. This argument has been forcefully
expressed:
The question of cost - of the proper weighing of competing val-
ues - is now the critical one for antitrust. The teachings of eco-
nomic theory may not be determinative of the outcome, but they
178. D. DzwEy, MONOPOLY iN EcoNozacs AND LAw, Preface (1959).
179. In a case where the participants in a price-fixing conspiracy agree to adopt
different price policies because they serve different customers, or different regional mar-
kets, this can be likened to a price-setting behavior of a so-called "discriminating mo-
nopolist." See W.J. BAUMOL, EcONOMIc THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYsIs 405-406
(1977).
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are not irrelevant. Through the use of economic analysis, the
costs of competing antitrust values can be identified with consid-
erable accuracy.1 0
The analytical portions of this article have applied standard
tools of economic analysis to identify "competing antitrust val-
ues" in the cases where the courts are required to balance the
interests of three parties: price-fixers, direct purchasers, and in-
direct purchasers. The theory developed methods which can be
applied to reveal the approximate magnitudes of the tradeoffsimposed on litigants by Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe. The
formulae and theoretical conclusions may not be dispositive of
the outcome in specific cases, but their contribution to the
proper enforcement of the antitrust laws should not be ignored.
180. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Popu-
lism and Cynicism, 67 MhcH. L. REv. 334 (1969).
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Appendix I
It will be observed that the pre-conspiracy profits of the di-
rect purchaser share a common quality with his smaller post-
conspiracy profits. This commonality is represented geometri-
cally by the boubly cross-hatched rectangle DEGP. It follows
that the injury suffered by the direct purchaser may be calcu-
lated after subtracting this common area from the two gross
profit rectangles. This leaves the net profits enjoyed by the di-
rect purchaser prior to the imposition of an unlawful overcharge
as the L-shaped area identified by ABCGED. Likewise, the'net
profits enjoyed by the direct purchaser after he has adjusted his
price and output in response to the unlawful overcharges is the
rectangle P1 GFP. The algebraic statements of these two quanti-
ties are given below.
Pre-violation net profits = (P,-MC1 ) • (Q-Q) + (MC-MC)
Q2
Post-violation net profits (P.-P ) Q,
Damages sustained by the direct purchaser are the difference
between his pre-violation net profits and his post-violation net
profits. Algebraically this is stated as:
(1) Damages = (P,-MC0) * (Q,-Q) + (MC2-MCJ) -Q, - (P. -
P).Q2
Equation (1) can be rewritten to rearrange terms as:
(2) Damages = (MC-MCd * Q - (P,-MC) • (Q2'Qd - (P2-P)
.Q2
The slope of the demand curve between prices P and P. is cal-
culated at dP/dQ = (P2-P) / (Q-Q 1), and the price-elasticity of
demand at the direct purchaser's post-violation price is calcu-
lated as B2 -- (dQ/dP) * (P2/Q). These two relations are com-
bined to enable us to substitute for the output differential ef-
fected by the direct purchaser:
(3) (Q,-Q) = B2 (Q2 P) * (P2-P)
Recall that the unlawful overcharge is manifested as an increase
in the marginal cost to the direct purchaser. (See discussion on
pages 198-200 of text.) We have the relation:
[Vol. 2:153
74http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/1
ILLINOIS BRICK
(4) MC2  (1 +r) - MC, implies MC2-MC. = rcMC.
Substituting equations (3) and (4) for their counterparts in the
damages equation (2) we have:
(5) Damages = rcMC1  Q - (P.-MCdE2 (Q2/P2) • (Pi-Pd -
(P2-P) Q2
The symbol L1 represents the Lerner Index of Monopoly Power
(whose meaning is discussed in the text), evaluated at the pre-
violation price/quantity configuration, or L, = (P1-MCd /P,.
Suppose, in order to simplify the notation, the percentage in-
crease in the price charged by the direct purchaser is measured
as rp; then rp -- (P2 "P1)/P1 . These two expressions are substi-
tuted into equation (5) with the result:
(6) Damages [rMC'-LES (-rp) Pi-rpP1 ] Qs1+rp
The cost component of expression (6), namely MC,, may be re-
placed by its equivalent in terms of the Lerner Index MC, = (1-
L)P. This substitution will allow us the P term to be factored
out of the bracketed expression to yield:
(7) Damages [rc(1-L)- (LIES 1) . rpI P1QI +rp
Lastly we recognize that the pre-violation price charged by the
direct purchaser, P1, can be represented as P2/(1+rp) with the
result that:
(8) Damages [rc(-Ld- ( LEhr + 1) rp I +rp
Notice that the term P2Q2 to the right of the bracketed expres-
sion is merely gross sales revenue enjoyed by the direct pur-
chaser subsequent to his post-violation price/output adjust-
ments. This can be symbolized as R2 to yield the final expression
in the test.
Appendix 2
Proof that a Profit-Maximizing Direct Purchaser will Pass-on
to His Customers Half the Burden of His Cost Increase
Consider the case depicted in Figure 3 in which the demand
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curve facing the direct purchaser is a straight line. Algebraically
this is expressed as:
A2.1 P = a-bQ
where Q is the quantity which will be demanded at a unit price
of P, and a and b are parameters such that a>o and b>o.
Prior to the effectuation of a price-fixing conspiracy the direct
purchaser's marginal cost is MCQ, a constant value for any level
of production. It is depicted as a horizontal line in Figure 3.
The pre-violation profit function is written as:
A2.2i r = P - Q - MC1 9 Q = (a-bQ)Q-MC. * Q
= aQ - bQ2-MC1Q
Profit maximization requires d ir/dQ = 0 which implies that
the pre-violation profit maximizing level of output is Q1* = (a-
MCd1)/2b and the direct purchaser's profit maximizing price is
P * = (a+MC)/2.
After the direct purchaser's suppliers conspire to raise the price,
he must pay them. The unlawful overcharge will be manifested
as an increase in the direct purchaser's marginal cost curve from
MC to MC2 as:
A2.3 MC. = (1 +rd * MC1
r. is the percentage increase in MC, resulting from the factor
price increase engineered by the price-fixers. Thus the gross in-
cremental burden imposed on the direct purchaser by the price
fixers is calculated as MC2-MC = r4°MC,.
The post-violation profits function is written as:
A2.4 1r= P * Q-MCO* Q = (a-bQ) * Q-MC(I+rc) - Q
= aQ-bQ2-(MC?* Q) - (1+rc)
If the direct purchaser consistently maximizes post-violation
profits we must find the values of Q and P which satisfy the
equation d 7r JdQ = 0. These values are Q,* = [a-MC,
(1+r)]/2b and P.* = [a+MC * (1+rd]12 respectively.
Thus the difference between the direct purchaser's post-viola-
tion profit maximizing price and his pre-violation profit maxi-
mizing price is:
A2.5 P,*-P* a+MC(l+r) _ a+MC,
2 21
2 (rcMC) Q.E.D.2
[Vol. 2:153
76http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/1
ILLINOIS BRICK
Appendix 3
Proof that the Policy of Cost-Plus Pricing, if Practiced by
Firms at Adjacent Links in the Distribution Chain, Results in
an Increase in the Price Elasticity of Demand as Markets
Approach the Final Consumer.
The method of proof will be inductive. The proposition will
be proven to be true for two arbitrarily chosen firms in a buyer/
seller relationship. This proof will immediately motivate a gen-
eral inference regarding the direction of change in price elastic-
ity for all successive links which conform to cost-plus pricing
behavior.
Consider firms at links 1, 2, and 3. Firms at 1 sell to firms at
2 who sell to firms at 3. Suppose the demand curve facing firms
at 1 is written as:
A3.1 P, =f(Q)
This demand curve is a symbolic expression of the willingness of
firms at link 2 to purchase Q units of the output from the firms
at link 1, if the unit price charged by the link 1 firms is P. The
law of demand states that in order for the quantity demanded to
increase the unit price must decrease. This implies that f,<O.
Now consider the demand by the firms at link 3 for the butput
of firms at link 2. The demand is respectable as a function of the
price charged by the link 2 firms afor their output thusly:
A3.2 P2 = f8(Q)
where fA<O. The functional expression in A3.2 is read to mean
that the firms at link 3 will want to purchase Q units from the
firms at link 2 if the latter set a unit price of P2.
At this point the notion of cost-plus pricing is introduced. This
is easily done by recognizing that the unit price paid by the link
2 firms to the link 1 firms is regarded by the link 2 firms as a
component of their average cost. The principal cost-plus pricing
is one in which the firm, acting in its capacity as a seller, deter-
mines a "markup" or "margin" which, when added to its average
cost, determines the price to be charged by the firm. Symboli-
cally, the price set by the link 2 firms for each unit of output
sold to the link 3 firms is written as:
A3.3 P2 = P1 + M
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where M is the markup determined by the link 2 firms.
Substituting the function expression A3.1 for P, into equation
A3.3 we may derive the demand functioning facing the link 2
firms in terms of their demand functions f.:
A3.4 P2 = f2(Q) + M
Applying the well-known formula for price elasticity to the de-
mand function of the link 2 firms results in:
A3.5 E dP Q f2 Q
Applying the same formula to the demand function facing the
link 2 firms there is:
A3.6 E 2 = . (I) = 1 (Pl+m)
dP, Q h Q
fh Q 12 Q
Substitution of expression A3.5 into A3.6 becomes:
A3.7 E2 = El 1/f. (M/Q)
Equation A3.7 is an expression signifying that the price elastic-
ity of demand for the output of.the link 2 firms, E, is greater
than the price elasticity of demand for the output of the link 1
firms, the discrepancy is solely attributable to the positive
markup M which, by hypothesis, is invariant with respect to
number of units sold.
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